The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
238.
Mr Bowen
explained to participants at the meeting that there was “a good
deal
of uncertainty
about American intentions in administering Iraq in the event of
(and after)
hostilities
to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime”. Meetings in Washington that
week
should
bring greater clarity but were unlikely to produce
decisions.
239.
Mr Bowen
reported that participants at the meeting had recognised
that:
“… even if
some of the big strategic issues remained unresolved, a lot of
detailed
management
issues were likely to arise. Much was likely to emanate
from
CENTCOM,
which had the prospectively imminent task of administering a
country
whose
leadership had been removed. With this in mind we agreed that we
should
set up an
Iraq Operational Policy Unit with contributions from the FCO,
DFID
and MOD …
My view was that we needed an integrated unit with high
calibre
representation
to work through the sort of issues that would confront the
Coalition
on the ‘day
after’. Their
initial remit would be to develop policy guidance to
enable the
administration of Iraq pending the appointment of a
transitional
civil
administration, consistent as far as possible with the longer term
vision
for the future
of Iraq. They would
need to work their way, with the US, through
issues as
diverse as humanitarian relief, policing, administration of
justice, local
government
and provision of utilities, environmental recovery and priorities
for the
return to
normality. The view we all reached was that this unit ought to be
up and
running
from Monday 10 February … It will need staff who think
strategically and
operationally
and have some background in state reconstruction from other
cases
(in order
to feed in the lessons of eg Kosovo and Afghanistan).”
240.
Mr Bowen
explained that the new unit would work alongside the FCO consular
and
emergency
units (described in more detail in the Box ‘The FCO Emergency Unit’
later in
this
Section), and with the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) in
MOD and the
Conflict
and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) in DFID.
241.
The UK’s
expectation was that:
“… General
Franks of CENTCOM will be in overall charge of Iraq, with the
military
chain of
command operating, which would involve [Major] General [Robin]
Brims
[General
Officer Commanding 1st (UK) Armoured Division (GOC 1 (UK)
Div)], being
in charge
of a sector of Iraq. Brims would need civilian support in theatre
(beyond an
MOD Polad
[policy adviser]), but it was too early to judge at what level; it
was clear
that there
would need to be FCO and DFID input. The extent to which the US
were
planning on
providing civil support to a British sector was as yet
unclear.”
242.
Mr Bowen
reported that participants at the meeting had identified other
possible
requirements,
including “a British office in the UK sector, a special envoy and
an
Ambassador”.
The new unit was only the first step.
352