10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

1058.  Mr David Quarrey, a Private Secretary in No.10, passed Mr Blair’s comments

on those reports to the FCO on 24 May.619 Mr Blair thought that it was vitally important

that the new Iraqi Prime Minister and President had “first-class support services and

an immediate media plan”. It was also vital that the Coalition had a plan to protect and

repair Iraq’s oil and electricity infrastructure, especially as the transition and summer

approached.

1059.  On 24 May, Mr Bob Morgan, an adviser to the Iraqi Oil Ministry employed by the

FCO, and his bodyguard Mr Mark Carman, were killed in Baghdad.620

1060.  Mr Blair held a video conference with President Bush on 26 May.621 Mr Blair said

that there had been a good meeting between the US and UK media teams, focused on

getting the right support for the new Iraqi Prime Minister.

1061.  Lt Gen John McColl, Senior British Military Representative, Iraq, advised the

28 May meeting of the ISG that there were “dangers of discontinuities” between the

end of the CPA and the start of the IIG.622 The CPA was ensuring co-ordination between

Iraqi ministries and between Baghdad and the provinces; there could be problems

after the dissolution of the CPA which could not be entirely overcome by the remaining

international advisers. Separately, there was a risk that key Iraqi Government employees

would not be paid during the transition.

1062.  Lt Gen McColl also warned of the risk of a gap between the end of CPA

reconstruction projects and the start of PMO projects, leading to a dip in employment

during the summer which would impact on the security situation. He recommended that

military commanders be given access to further, and larger scale, funding for QIPs to fill

the gap.

1063.  The ISG asked DFID to look again at the risk of a reconstruction gap, and MOD

to approach the Treasury about further funding for QIPs.

1064.  On 1 June the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) was sworn in, with Dr Ayad Allawi

as Prime Minister and Dr Barham Salih as Deputy Prime Minister.623

1065.  Mr Alan Charlton, Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy Washington, reported

US transition plans on 3 June.624 In addition to the Embassy in Baghdad, there would be

four “Regional Hubs”: Mosul, Kirkuk, Hillah and Basra. There was a growing realisation

within the US Government that the mission after transition would be very different.

Mr John Negroponte, US Ambassador-designate, had defined his mission as supporting,

rather than directing, the IIG.

619  Letter Quarrey to Owen, 24 May 2004, ‘Iraq’.

620  Minutes, 25 May 2004, Iraq Senior Officials Group meeting; BBC News, 26 May 2004, Oil expert killed

in Iraq ‘felt safe’.

621  Letter Quarrey to Owen, 26 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s VTC with Bush, 26 May’.

622  Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 28 May 2004, ‘Iraq Strategy Group’.

623  BBC News, 1 June 2004, Iraq’s interim cabinet sworn in.

624  Telegram 684 Washington to FCO London, 3 June 2004, ‘Iraq: US Mission Transition Planning’.

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