9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007

597.  Gen Dannatt visited Baghdad and MND(SE) from 14 to 15 February.308 He reported

Maj Gen Shaw’s views that there was merit in maintaining a MNF presence in Basra

Palace at least until PIC, both to help preserve the UK’s relationship with the US in

theatre and because he believed that a UK military presence in Basra was required

for as long as MND(SE) was responsible for security there. Gen Dannatt commented in

his report:

“The military logic behind maintaining situational awareness in the City is

impeccable, but over time there may be different ways of delivering it at a reduced

scale of MNF military commitment at the Palace … PIC and our withdrawal from BP

[Basra Palace] will be linked, but need not be slavishly.

“… Our decision to reinforce Afghanistan … can only be delivered by the TRB

[Theatre Reserve Battalion] … In simple force generation terms, we can only do this

if [we] get down to four battlegroup HQs … in Iraq. And we are only likely to do this if

we withdraw from BP …

“Finally on BP, I found it rather incoherent to learn that … our own Consulate were

planning to withdraw from the Palace shortly … I found all of this rather indicative to

the whole BP issue: untidy and somewhat incoherent … I sense our decision making

across Whitehall has lacked agility, failing to mesh the different strategic dynamics

and imperatives emerging from Washington, Baghdad, Kabul and Mons [i.e. NATO],

over these past few months, in a timely manner. Meanwhile, soldiers are being

wounded in BP – shortly one may be killed.”

598.  The Private Secretary to Mr Bill Jeffrey, MOD Permanent Under Secretary,

annotated those comments:

“[Those paragraphs] don’t strike me as very helpful. I don’t recall him making these

points before decisions were made.”309

He added:

“I gather CDS [ACM Stirrup] raised this at the COS(I) [Chiefs of Staff Informal

meeting] and CGS [Gen Dannatt] basically said this note had been badly drafted

and he was (of course) totally onside …”310

599.  General Dannatt also commented:

“It is the prospect of political accommodation that I found the most encouraging.

‘Reconciliation’ and ‘outreach’ are not exactly new concepts in the Iraq campaign,

but I do sense that the conditions for them are increasingly favourable …

308  Minute CGS to CDS, 19 February 2007, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 14‑15 Feb 07’.

309  Manuscript comment Helliwell to Jeffrey on Minute CGS to CDS, 19 February 2007, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq:

14‑15 Feb 07’.

310  Manuscript comment Jeffrey on Minute CGS to CDS, 19 February 2007, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq:

14‑15 Feb 07’.

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