9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
119.
Dr Rubaie
asked Gen Mohan to pull together all his requirements into a
formal
plan,
“copied to MOD and MOI [Ministry of the Interior] to enable them to
attempt to
resource
it”.
120.
On 19 July,
the Assessments Staff reported to Mr McDonald on the
probability
that JAM in
Basra would consider the coming UK withdrawal from Basra Palace as
a
significant
victory and use it to intensify attacks until UK forces were driven
out of Iraq.53
JAM
appeared confident of being able to take control of Basra City soon
and felt no
need to
negotiate with Iraqi or UK authorities.
121.
Mr McDonald
prepared further advice on transition for Mr Brown on 20
July.54
He advised
that the overwatch phase, conducted from Basra Air Station, should
be
time‑limited
from the outset. He estimated that withdrawing the majority of UK
forces
and moving
to a purely training mission in Basra would take around six
months.
122.
Once
withdrawal from the Air Station was complete, the UK “would have
to
persuade
the Americans to house and protect our training forces”, possibly
in Dhi Qar
province,
where Australian and Romanian training teams were already operating
from
a US base.
Mr McDonald proposed that the UK should continue its other
contributions
to the
wider Iraq theatre (a “niche contribution” to action against AQ-I
in Balad, a naval
deployment
in the Gulf and a contribution to air strike
operations).
123.
Mr McDonald
said that his proposals had not been discussed with
government
departments
but he judged the military would support them “because they are
keen
to get out
of Basra and MND(SE) but see the importance for alliance reasons
of
maintaining
a presence in 2008”. President Bush was unlikely to be pleased but
the rest
of the US
Administration “see that things are changing”. Mr McDonald
judged:
“Only the
Iraqis can fulfil the key task of political reconciliation. It
seems that they
won’t feel
the necessary pressure to get on with the job until the coalition
begins
to leave;
and, as they try to do that job, they will need continued training
and
mentoring.
This plan would be compatible with that.”
124.
The weekly
Iraq update for Mr Brown on 20 July said that in Basra “a
downbeat
assessment
of the security situation means that Provincial Iraqi Control is
unlikely before
125.
Maj Gen Shaw
and government officials working closely with the military met
JAM1
on 25
July.56
At the
meeting JAM1 noted the success of the trial cease-fire from 15
to
17 June and
said that he was still prepared to negotiate with MNF to bring
about further
reductions
in violence. However, the stalling of negotiations since that
cease-fire had
53
Minute
Burrell to McDonald, 19 July 2007, ‘Iraq intelligence update – 19
July 2007’.
54
Minute
McDonald to Prime Minister, 20 July 2007, ‘Iraq –
transition’.
55
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 20 July 2007,
‘Iraq – weekly update’.
56
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Leslie, 10 August 2007,
‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]: update on negotiations with JAM in
Basrah’.
207