9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
evidence of
widespread or deep support for Muqtada, in the police or the
population
at large.
Their loyalties have come under pressure as they watch the events
unfold
in Najaf
…”
85.
On 20 August,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary wrote to the Overseas and
Defence
Secretariat
of the Cabinet Office to commission a:
“… full
picture of the situation in Iraq after the National Conference, how
we are
going to
get from here to successful elections in January, and the
challenges we
86.
Mr
Phillipson’s letter followed a “long discussion” the previous day
with Mr Blair,
who had
observed that the security situation and the slow rate at which the
ISF were
being
trained and equipped presented a real risk to the achievement of
the UK’s
objectives
in Iraq. Mr Blair had indicated that he wanted to discuss Iraq
strategy with
President
Bush “soon”.
87.
The British
Embassy Office Basra remained “in lock-down, with a twice
daily
helicopter
service to the airport”.42
88.
Mr Ali A
Allawi recorded in his book on the Occupation of Iraq that Grand
Ayatollah
al-Sistani
brokered a solution to the violence in Najaf and
Kufa.43
The five
point
agreement
he negotiated with Muqtada al-Sadr on 26 August called
for:
•
demilitarisation
of Najaf and the nearby city of Kufa and the withdrawal of
all
armed
groups;
•
responsibility
for maintaining law and order in the two cities to be handed to
the
Iraqi police;
•
withdrawal
of all foreign forces from the two cities;
•
compensation
by the Iraqi Government for all victims of the violence;
and
•
completion
of a census as the basis of general elections to restore
complete
Iraqi
sovereignty.
89.
According to
Mr Allawi:
“Muqtada
couched his climbdown in terms of submission to the demands of
the
highest
religious authority. The Interim Government had no choice but to
accept the
terms of
the agreement …”
90.
Mr Allawi
judged that, although all the key players claimed some part in the
success
in reaching
agreement, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, by demonstrating his control
over the
Shia,
emerged the “only clear winner”.
41
Letter
Phillipson to Fergusson, 20 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’.
42
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Jack, 23 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Ad
Hoc Group’.
43 Allawi
AA. The
Occupation of Iraq: winning the war, losing the
peace. Yale
University Press, 2007.
409