The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
915.
The draft
I-CAP stated that the UK had pledged £544m at the Madrid
Donors
Conference.
Channelling DFID resources through the World Bank and UN Trust
Funds,
which had
proved effective in Afghanistan, should reduce administrative costs
and
promote
donor co-ordination. The (unspecified) “remainder” of DFID’s funds
would be
used for
bilateral programmes.
916.
The I-CAP
re-stated DFID guidance that progress against a CAP should
be
assessed
annually, and that a CAP should be subject to a “major review”
every three or
four years.
It also stated that, given the rapidly changing situation in Iraq,
it would need
a “substantial”
review after one year.
917.
The draft
I-CAP did not offer an annual budget for DFID’s Iraq programme, for
the
three
strategic objectives, or for the three levels of
activity.
918.
The I-CAP was
published in February.527
Three changes
had been made from the
final draft
submitted to the 22 January meeting of the AHMGIR:
•
Risks were
recast as assumptions. For example, the risk that the
security
situation
would not improve become an assumption that it would.
•
The section
on security included the statement that there were signs
that
security
was improving.
•
The section
on lessons no longer included the caveat that DFID’s
knowledge
of Iraq
was limited.
919.
Sir Hilary
Synnott’s posting as Head of CPA(South) ended at the end of
January
2004. He
was succeeded by Mr Patrick Nixon, former British Ambassador
in Abu Dhabi.
920.
Sir Hilary
sent his valedictory telegram to the FCO on 26
January.528
His
comments
on the
political process and overall progress in Iraq are described in
Section 9.2.
Sir Hilary
also reflected on the state of CPA(South) when he arrived in July
2003, and his
efforts to
secure additional staff and resources:
“The UK’s
pre-planning fell short of making practical dispositions, and
political
direction
of resources was complicated by deep differences at Cabinet
level.
…
“We
borrowed computers from the Americans and scrounged Kuwaiti
mobiles
from where
we could. None were available through the FCO. DFID were
generous
with sat
phones and laptops to their contracted staff … London asked for
frequent
reporting.
I sent it over an unclassified and temperamental Yahoo link … All
this was
several
months after the end of the conflict and remained like this for
several months
more
…
527
Department
for International Development, Iraq:
Interim Country Assistance Plan, February
2004.
528
Telegram 10
Basra to FCO London, 26 January 2004, ‘Basra
Valedictory’.
158