The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
for the
medical equipment to support Package 3; that approval, and the
subsequent
Treasury
authority to commence procurement, was needed as soon as
possible.
29.
The official
advised that in “about three months time” the DMS would
have
“minimised
medical risk by being properly equipped in mission critical
areas”.
30.
On 11
December, Gen O’Donoghue told the Chiefs of Staff that the DoH had
been
engaged on
Iraq planning, and had responded “positively and
pragmatically”.12
31.
The DCRS
agreed the business cases for the medical modules (packages
of
equipment
and supplies) to support Package 3 on 16 December.13
The modules
were
expected to
achieve “full capability in theatre” on 15 March 2003.
32.
At the
beginning of 2003, in the light of continued uncertainty on whether
Turkey
would agree
to the use of its territory by Coalition ground forces, the focus
of UK military
planning
shifted from the North to the South of Iraq (see Sections 6.1 and
6.2).
33.
The Permanent
Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) assessed that the shift made
the
UK medical
mission “less demanding in terms of supporting
manoeuvre”.14
A
revised
Estimate
specified that the Role 3 medical support required:
•
the Royal
Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Argus, as the Primary Casualty Receiving
Facility
(PCRF),
with 100 beds;
•
two 200-bed
field hospitals deployed;
•
a third
200-bed field hospital in reserve;
•
casualty
staging flights through Cyprus; and
•
the
augmentation of the Princess Mary Military Hospital in
Cyprus.
34.
RFA Argus
deployed on 15 January and was operational in the North Arabian
Gulf
by
mid-February.
35.
Mr Alan
Milburn, the Health Secretary, wrote to Mr Hoon on 10 March to
inform him
that the
DoH was ready to activate the RAMP, when required.15
36.
Mr Hoon was
advised by PJHQ on 14 March that an “effective medical
capability”,
scaled to
the expected number of casualties, was now operational in
theatre.16
Arrangements
were also in place for the aeromedical evacuation of casualties to
the UK.
12
Minutes, 11
December 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
13
Minute
MOD/DCRS [junior official] to APS/SoS [MOD], 31 January 2003,
‘Possible Operations against
Iraq UOR
List, 31 January 2003’.
14
Report
PJHQ, July 2003, ‘Operation TELIC 1 – Medical Post Operation
Report’.
15
Letter
Milburn to Hoon, 10 March 2003, ‘Military Deployment to the Middle
East: the NHS’s
Responsibilities’.
16
Minute PJHQ
[junior official] to PS/SoS [MOD], 14 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC –
Casualty Treatment and
Management
Arrangements’.
44