The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
567.
There is no
indication in the record that Mr Blair raised either
post-conflict planning
or the
post-conflict role of the UN during his conversation with President
Bush.244
568.
Mr Mandelson
raised UK military concerns about post-conflict planning
with
Mr Blair
on 23 February.
569.
On 23
February, after visits to Japan, Korea, Bahrain and Qatar,
Mr Mandelson
emailed
Mr Blair and Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of
Staff, about Iraq,
commenting
that “people are more worried about what follows a war than winning
it”.245
Mr Mandelson
stated that:
“American
occupation and rule will be highly de-stabilising and will, in my
view,
radicalise
opinion far more than the military action itself … At the moment,
the
Arab League
is well balanced … If post-Saddam Iraq goes wrong we can
expect
mounting
trouble. I should add here that Air Marshal Brian Burridge [UK
National
Contingent
Commander (NCC)] and [Major] General Peter Wall [Deputy Chief
of
Operations]
whom I saw at the US/British HQ outside Doha are also worried
about
post-Saddam
planning. I am not sure exactly what is worrying them so much
but
they fear
an FCO reluctance to ‘post plan’ too much, that we are not
developing our
own
independent views but following in the American train and that we
will not have
sufficient
strength on the ground to enforce our own judgements and will over
the
best
arrangements for Iraqi governance after the
hostilities.
…
“They
wonder whether the perceived lack of British pre-planning over
the
humanitarian
follow up is because Clare [Short] won’t accept the likelihood of
war.
They
emphasise the clear up – in different scenarios – will be huge. Are
we all really
ready for
it, they wonder.”
570.
The
potential scale and complexity of the post-conflict task facing the
UK
in southern
Iraq was made clear in a February JIC Assessment.
571.
The JIC
warned that failure to meet popular expectations over
humanitarian
aid and
reconstruction and rapidly to restore law and order could
undermine
support for
any post-Saddam Hussein administration.
244
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq and MEPP: Prime
Minister’s Telephone
Conversation
with Bush, 19 February’.
245
Email
Mandelson to Powell, 23 February 2003, ‘Back from
travels’.
410