The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
She explained
that DFID had already taken increased responsibility for the SU.
The
DFID
Director chairing the SU Board would act as Senior Responsible
Officer for the
Unit and be
responsible for developing capability and overall performance. More
broadly,
departments
had agreed that the SU Board needed to provide “more active
governance
and
direction” for the Unit than had been the case in the
past.
960.
In October
2009, the SU took over responsibility from the FCO for managing
the
deployment
of civilians and police officers to international
missions.609
961.
The MOD, FCO
and DFID produced a joint memorandum on progress
against
the
recommendations in the Cabinet Office review for the House of
Commons Defence
Committee
in December 2009.610
The joint
memorandum stated:
“A 1,000
strong civilian capability (of whom 200 can be deployed at any one
time)
has been
developed ahead of schedule; greater capacity for planning and
rapid
reaction in
[the] Stabilisation Unit will be in place by the December [2009]
target
date; and
progress has also been made on deployment of military Reservists
in
a civilian
capacity and police deployments. The additional capabilities have
been
developed
at a significantly lower cost than originally
envisaged.”
962.
In a brief
reference to Iraq, the joint memorandum stated:
“… SU
managed consultants to support capacity building in Basra
International
Airport,
leading to the handover to Iraqi control in January 2009, improved
the
effectiveness
of donor support in rule of law nationally and undertook a series
of
reviews to
improve the effectiveness of the Basra PRT and identify future
lessons.”
963.
In August
2010, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published a review
of
the
Government’s progress in promoting stability in countries emerging
from conflict.611
The review
was written by Mr Richard Teuten, a Senior Visiting Fellow at
RUSI and a
former Head
of the PCRU, and Mr Daniel Korski, Senior Policy Fellow at the
European
Council of
Foreign Relations and a former Deputy Head of the
PCRU.
964.
The review
concluded that, between 2005 and 2010, a drive towards
greater
inter‑departmental
co-operation had led to a number of institutional innovations,
an
increase in
the resources available for stabilisation, new cadres of
practitioners and
609
Briefing
Stewart, [undated], ‘From Iraq to Afghanistan – The evolution of
“Stabilisation”’.
610
Seventh
Report from the Defence Committee, Session 2009-10,
Third
supplementary memorandum
from the
Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the
Department for International
Development:
Strengthening of the Stabilisation Unit and implementation of the
Cabinet Office Task Force
review of
stabilisation and civil effect, 15 December 2009.
611
R. Teuten
and D. Korski, Preparing
for Peace. Britain’s Contribution and Capabilities, RUSI,
2010.
520