The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to shore up
the coalition through to September looms large. Neither argument
is
entirely
rational and all UK levers will need to be applied to persuade them
their
fears are
unfounded and that it is in the interests of GOI and US to grant
PIC
to Basra.”
41.
Maj Gen Shaw
told the Inquiry that:
“Our
attempt to choreograph the granting of PIC and the withdrawal of
troops and
the handing
over of Basra Palace just crashed and burned because of course
we
didn’t own
the turf … We owned the troop levels, and I was still trying to
hang on
to that.
The Iraqis suddenly owned Basra Palace, and then it was the Iraqis
and
Americans
that owned PIC. That sort of confusion of C2 [command and
control]
meant that
choreographing those three was very difficult.”23
42.
On 4 July,
Mr Brown answered the first set of Prime Minister’s Questions
of his term
in
office.24
Asked about
whether he would set a timetable for withdrawing UK troops
from
Iraq,
Mr Brown said that it would be:
“… wrong to
set a timetable at this stage. What we have done is reduce the
number
of troops
from 44,000 to 5,500 and move from combat to overwatch in
three
provinces
of Iraq. What we await is a decision to move to overwatch in the
fourth
province of
Basra, but we have obligations, which we have accepted, both to
the
United
Nations and the Iraqi Government, and we are not going to break
those
obligations
at this stage.”
43.
On 4 July, a
senior official specialising in the Middle East sent
advice
to Mr David Richmond,
FCO Director General Defence and Intelligence, for
onward
submission
to Mr Miliband.25
It was
copied to Mr Desmond Bowen, MOD Policy Director,
and Vice
Admiral Charles Style, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Commitments).
44.
The senior
official wrote that he sought:
“…
authority for HMG officials to discuss an opportunity to bring
about a reduction
in violence
from Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in Basra, with the Government of Iraq
(GoI)
and General
Petraeus, the (US) Commanding General Multi-National Force
Iraq
(CG MNF-I).
Subject to GoI and US views, [UK officials] would aim to
negotiate
an initial
month-long reduction in violence from JAM on satisfactory terms
and,
consulting
continuously as appropriate, would then explore options for
extending this
reduction
in violence and folding it into broader political engagement with
JAM and
the
Sadrist movement.
23
Private
hearing, 21 June 2010, pages 35-36.
24
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 4 July
2007, column 953.
25
Minute
senior official specialising in the Middle East to Richmond, 4 July
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
Negotiations with JAM in Basrah’.
190