The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
On 6 June
2006, Mr Andrew Noble, FCO Director of Security, stated:
“we
are
operating at the limits of what can be achieved, consistent with
running a
•
On 22
January 2007, Dr Rosalind Marsden, the British Consul General in
Basra,
reported
that she had been advised by her Overseas Security Manager that
“we
are
beginning to push our luck”.16
44.
The critical
contribution of some of the protective measures introduced in Iraq
is
reflected
in comments by Mr Robert Tinline, Head of the Basra Provincial
Reconstruction
Team (PRT)
in 2007 and 2008. In April 2007, he informed the FCO that more
than
1,200 rockets
and mortars had been fired at the Basra Palace site since
September
2006.17
Although
the BPC had been hit 70 times:
“We were
fortunate that none of our staff were killed or injured ... But we
also made
our own
good fortune. Four accommodation ‘pods’, the bar, the gym and both
the
main office
buildings received direct hits – but because they were hardened,
no
serious
injuries resulted.”
45.
The
progressive introduction of protective security measures between
2003 and
2008 placed
growing constraints on civilians’ ability to carry out their jobs
effectively.
46.
LE staff and
contractors became critically important to the UK reconstruction
effort.
47.
The limited
availability of secure transport had particular consequences for
the way
civilians
operated.
48.
Mr Martin
Dinham, DFID Director Europe, Middle East and Americas from 2005
to
2007, told
the Inquiry that, during 2006 and 2007, access to a number of
infrastructure
projects
was so difficult that “we had to arrange to work through local
contractors …
taking
videos, taking digital images, contacting us by email, meeting them
in safe
locations
so we could actually supervise at one remove”.18
49.
From mid-2003,
officials had recognised that measures to protect civilians
from
the
security threat could have implications for the UK’s ability to
achieve its strategic
objectives
in Iraq.
50.
Despite the
warnings, the Government failed to establish a strategic
framework
for
assessing the impact of the security threat and protective security
measures on UK
objectives
or to agree an appropriate response.
15
Minute
Noble to Casey, 6 June 2006, ‘Security of our Posts in Baghdad and
Basra’.
16
Letter
Marsden to McDonald, 22 January 2007, ‘Basra Palace: Response to
Increased IDF Threat’.
17
eGram
17758/07 Basra to FCO London, 30 April 2007, ‘Basra: Move of the
British Embassy Office’.
18
Public
hearing, 17 December 2009, page 43.
418