9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
gradual
tapering. Jock strongly favoured the first option, as once you
begin this sort
of process,
our forces become vulnerable and it is best to get on with things
as fast
as possible.”
782.
Sir Nigel
commented to Mr Blair:
“This will
obviously need to be debated and tweaked a good deal, but I found
the
overall
thesis persuasive. It would be virtually impossible for UK
Ministers to ask
the Army to
stay in significant numbers in Basra if the advice from the Chiefs
is that
there is no
militarily useful mission to conduct – the risks are just too high
… The key
issue
remains the likely US
reaction to this
plan. I suspect that they will want Basra
PIC to be
delayed from July to the autumn …
“You will
need to chair a meeting of DOP in June which would finally confirm
the
closing
of Basra
Palace in August
(which would need to be announced in July);
discuss the
timing of PIC; and
could look ahead in general terms to the rest of the
year. But
it would be too early in June to make any firm judgments, still
less any
decisions
about our long term intentions.”428
“I entirely
understand it in military terms, but in terms of what happens in
Basra, it
will be
very hard to present as anything other than a total withdrawal.
This can work
if Basra’s
politics are sorted in the meantime but otherwise it cd be very
dangerous
for the
stability of Iraq, & the US will, rightly, be v.
concerned.”429
784.
Mr Browne
told Cabinet on 3 May that the “emerging political vacuum”
threatened
to
undermine UK efforts and the gains made by Op SINBAD in
Basra.430
The
Governor
of Basra
was assailed on all sides and was ineffective. The militias were
vying for
political
power and, although the MNF had the capacity to tackle them, doing
so raised
the threat
level to UK forces deployed there: 90 percent of attacks were now
directed
against the
MNF.
785.
Outside Basra,
Mr Browne said that the security situation was more
complex:
terrorism
was fuelling sectarian violence. The Baghdad Security Plan was
reducing
violence
but could not stop the “spectacular” attacks, coverage of which
masked more
positive
developments. In Anbar province the tribal leaders were taking the
lead in
driving Al
Qaida out.
786.
The Shia
“remained a significant problem” and were reluctant to let go of
their
monopoly on
power for fear of further subjugation. Mr Browne judged that
there was
“a closing
window for bringing the Shia round”.
428
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq’.
429
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq’.
430
Cabinet
Conclusions, 3 May 2007.
147