12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
739.
On 11 May, a
JIC Assessment on the ISF stated:
“There is
no coherent Iraqi counter‑insurgency strategy and the balance
of
responsibility
between the MOD and MOI and other government departments
is
740.
Mr Blair
spoke to Prime Minister Ja’afari for the first time on 26 May and
said that
“we stood
ready to help in any way we could”, in particular on developing the
ISF.684
741.
On 3 August, a
junior official in Baghdad emailed FCO officials and No.10 to
inform
them that
Prime Minister Ja’afari would announce a 12‑point security plan the
following
day.685
The
official described the intended announcement as “nothing
particularly new”,
with the
exception of a plan to co‑ordinate intelligence, “neighbourhood
watch”, and a
possible
amnesty for political groups. The purpose of the plan was to
structure activities
that the
government and MNF‑I had been taking into measurable objectives
with actions
assigned to
specific Ministers.
742.
Following the
announcement, the official told Mr Asquith that Prime
Minister
Ja’afari
had been “ultra‑cautious” and omitted “many of the details that
were most
interesting”.
He reported that the possible amnesty had been toned down to
“national
dialogue
with those with whom a dialogue is possible”.
743.
The JIC
reported on 12 October that:
“The Iraqi
Transitional Government (ITG) has failed to develop a coherent
national
security
strategy. This will not change in the short time remaining before
the
December
election. Nor will there be a significant increase of capacity in
the security
ministries
or development of intelligence capability. The need to establish a
new
Iraqi
administration following the elections means that we are likely to
see little
momentum in
these critical areas over much of the next year.”686
744.
At the
Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy ‑ Iraq
(DOP(I)) on
16 June,
there was a discussion of progress on police and judicial reform
within Iraq.687
The
following points were raised:
“Having
effective police would be one condition for achieving the
successful
drawdown of
the coalition’s military forces in Iraq.
683
JIC
Assessment, 11 May 2005, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces’.
684
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 26 May 2005, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Ja’afari’.
685
Email FCO
[junior official] to various, 3 August 2005, ‘Iraq Media Grp Mtg
3.00pm 3 August’.
686
JIC
Assessment, 12 October 2005, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Very Slow
Progress’.
687
Minutes, 16
June 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
221