The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
296.
The paper also
set out three illustrative options for a military campaign, with a
very
high‑level
assessment of their advantages and disadvantages:
•
“Air and SF
[Special Forces] Precision Strike”: with the
aim of generating
“a ‘knock
out’ blow of key installations and facilities” that would “shatter
the
regime and
cause its downfall”. The option had “gained high level
enthusiastic
backing in
Washington” although that might “now be waning”. It was
“unlikely
to be
chosen as a discrete option” but elements would form parts of the
other
two options.
•
“Strategic
‘Coup de Main’”: once
“Saddam’s regime had been ‘squeezed’
by all the
means at the Coalition’s disposal” – political, diplomatic, legal
and
economic –
air assault forces would be used to seize “key regime power
centres
(mainly in
Baghdad)” and “NBC weapons, sites and command and
control
nodes”. The
option was “Politically attractive” but militarily “high risk” and
would
need
strategic surprise.
•
“Conventional
‘Heavy Punch’”:
“essentially the re‑run” of the 1991 Gulf
Conflict,
which provided the “safer military option”.
297.
The MOD has
been unable to locate any record of the “Think Tank”
discussion.139
298.
Subsequent
revisions of the paper before the end of 2002 are addressed later
in
this
Section.
299.
The
development of SPG thinking on post‑conflict issues is addressed
in
Section 6.4.
300.
Mr McKane
wrote to Sir David Manning describing the discussion at the
“Think
Tank” as
“preparatory to military talks with the US … at which Tony Pigott
and
Desmond Bowen
would represent the UK”.140
301.
Mr McKane
stated that he had been struck by two points:
“There is a
huge amount of work to be done if the UK is to be in a position
to
participate
in any operation against Iraq …”
“We may
need to confront the legal base for military action sooner rather
than later.
The MOD say
that the US will not admit the UK to detailed joint planning unless
we
are able to
agree that regime change is a legitimate and legal
objective.”
302.
Mr McKane
recommended that Sir David should reply to Mr Hoon’s
letter of
31 May
seeking “further and better particulars on the time‑lines and
precisely what
decisions
incurring significant expenditure would be required now in order to
keep open
the
possibility of a large scale deployment in six months
time”.
139
Letter MOD
Iraq Inquiry Unit to Iraq Inquiry Secretariat, 23 May 2012,
[untitled].
140
Minute
McKane to Manning, 18 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
220