The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
977.
Additionally,
in Dhi Qar province the Italian brigade was responsible for IPS
training
and
mentoring, employing their Carabinieri. Royal Military Police (RMP)
and other
coalition
troops (including Danes and Czechs) were involved in mentoring and
follow‑up
training in
the other three provinces. CPATT also provided International Police
Liaison
Officers
(IPLOs) to MND(SE) to conduct training and mentoring, and to ensure
that
training in
MND(SE) was consistent with efforts elsewhere in Iraq.
978.
In total,
including the spend on equipping the police under Project
OSIRIS
(described
earlier in this Section), police SSR spending represented less than
two
percent of
the annual spend by the UK on Iraq – estimated to be £1bn in
financial year
2005/06.
979.
The Chiefs of
Staff considered SSR on 18 October.912
They
concluded: “The
military
effort was well resourced compared to the commitments by other
Government
departments.”
Now that Dr Reid would be responsible for SSR in Iraq, it
would be
“important
to calculate the resources needed to deliver [this] and to secure
appropriate
HMT
[Treasury] funding”.
980.
On 24 October,
Maj Gen Dutton sent a paper with proposals on how to
reform the
IPS
programme in MND(SE) to Maj Gen Wall.913
He wrote
that:
“As time
has gone by, it has become clear that the aspirations in the
existing plan
are
unachievable. We need to be realistic about what we can expect to
achieve: we
should be
aiming for a police force that is relevant and ‘good enough’ for
this region.”
981.
Maj Gen Dutton
stated: “We must dismiss any ideas of starting again: it is
reform
that is
required, not complete re‑design.” He proposed “a three‑point
plan”:
•
removal of
those senior elements of the IPS who were engaged in serious
crime,
acknowledging
that that may require the MNF to act if it could not be
achieved
by the
ITG;
•
dismissal
of uncommitted IPS officers (estimated by the Basra Chief of Police
to
number
around 6,000 in a total force of 30,000); and
•
“redoubling
efforts on training the remaining police, so that eventually the
‘good’
outweighs
the ‘bad’”.
982.
On 25 October,
Mr Tansley submitted recommendations along similar lines to
the
FCO, also
proposing the three‑point plan.914
He wrote
that a “key part” of the plan would
be for
“joint teams” from PATs and MND(SE) conducting “surges” on police
districts and
stations
that were “exposed as the weakest or of most
importance”.
912
Minutes, 18
October 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
913
Letter
Dutton to Wall, 24 October 2005, ‘Policing SE Iraq’.
914
Telegram
16521/05 Basra to FCO London, 25 October 2005, ‘Reform of the Iraq
Police Service in
South‑East’.
280