6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
1028.
Mr Blair
had been given clear warnings about the strategic
significance
of the
post-conflict phase and the need to address inadequacies in US
planning
throughout
the second half of 2002, including by:
•
Mr Hoon on
2 July;
•
Mr Straw on
8 July;
•
Mr Powell
on 19 July;
•
participants
in Mr Blair’s meeting of 23 July;
•
Sir
Christopher Meyer on 6 September;
•
parliamentarians
on 24 September and 25 November; and
•
the MOD in
Mr Watkins’ letter of 19 November and in the SPG paper
of 13
December.
1029.
Despite
those warnings, there is no evidence that officials or
Ministers
addressed
whether it was realistic to expect that the objectives could be
achieved.
1030.
Mr Campbell
wrote to Mr Blair on 19 December, setting out the need to
explain
the UK’s
strategy.492
He observed
that: “Iraq is moving up a gear as an issue and as we
enter the
New Year we need to step up our communications
efforts.”
1031.
Mr Campbell
recommended that the objectives approved by Mr Blair in
October
should be
published as soon as Parliament returned on 7 January, with a
statement
in the
House of Commons from Mr Blair alongside publicity generated by the
FCO
Heads of
Mission Conference. The statement would set out the strategic
framework
for the
Government’s overall approach and draw together the diplomatic,
political and
humanitarian
strands of the strategy on Iraq as well as addressing issues of
proliferation
and
terrorism.
1032.
Mr Campbell
argued that the communications strategy “should be rooted in
where
we think we
will end up which currently looks like a military conflict that
ends in Saddam
falling”.
The major steps and key messages envisaged by Mr Campbell included:
“Post-
conflict:
We’re there to help for the long term.”
1033.
On 4 January,
Mr Blair sent a long note to officials in No.10 (see Section
3.6).493
On Iraq, he
stated that there was “a big job of persuasion” to be done. That
included
showing
“sensitivity to any humanitarian fall-out from war. Britain should
take the lead on
this,
working with the UN.”
1034.
On 6 January,
the Cabinet Office informed the FCO that Mr Blair had decided
the
policy
objectives for Iraq should be placed in the public
domain.494
492
Minute
Campbell to Prime Minister, 19 December 2002, ‘Re: Iraq
Communications’.
493
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 4 January 2003, [extract
‘Iraq’].
494
Letter
Bowen to McDonald, 6 January 2003, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper
[unattributed], January 2003,
‘Iraq: Policy
Objectives’.
287