The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

of the inspectors, however, as was often pointed out, was not to seek out assets that

had been hidden, but rather to validate Iraqi claims.

329. By March 2003, however:

• The Al Samoud 2 missiles which exceeded the range permitted by the UN,

were being destroyed.

• The IAEA had concluded that there was no Iraqi nuclear programme of any

significance.

• The inspectors believed that they were making progress and expected to

achieve more co-operation from Iraq.

• The inspectors were preparing to step up their activities with U2 flights and

interviews outside Iraq.

330. When the UK sought a further Security Council resolution in March 2003, the

majority of the Council’s members were not persuaded that the inspections process, and

the diplomatic efforts surrounding it, had reached the end of the road. They did not agree

that the time had come to terminate inspections and resort to force. The UK went to war

without the explicit authorisation which it had sought from the Security Council.

331. At the time of the Parliamentary vote of 18 March, diplomatic options had not

been exhausted. The point had not been reached where military action was the

last resort.

332. Mr Blair had been advised that an invasion of Iraq was expected to increase

the threat to the UK and UK interests from Al Qaida and its affiliates.

333. Asked about the risk that attacking Iraq with cruise missiles would “act as a

recruiting sergeant for a young generation throughout the Islamic and Arab world”,

Mr Blair responded that:

“… what was shocking about 11 September was not just the slaughter of innocent

people but the knowledge that, had the terrorists been able, there would have

been not 3,000 innocent dead, but 30,000 or 300,000 … America did not attack the

Al Qaida terrorist group … [it] attacked America. They did not need to be recruited …

Unless we take action against them, they will grow. That is why we should act.”157

334. The JIC judged in October 2002 that “the greatest terrorist threat in the event of

military action against Iraq will come from Al Qaida and other Islamic extremists”; and

they would be “pursuing their own agenda”.158

157 House of Commons, Official Report, 18 March 2003, column 769.

158 JIC Assessment, 10 October 2002, ‘International Terrorism: The Threat from Iraq’.

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