The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses conclusions in relation to evidence of the UK’s role
after the
conflict in
Iraq, including:
•
the
development of UK strategy and deployment plans in response to
the
changing
security situation, particularly in Basra and the
South;
•
UK
influence on the development of a new political system in Iraq;
and
•
UK
influence on US decision-making in relation to Iraq.
2.
This Section
does not address:
•
preparations
for the UK’s post-conflict role in Iraq, which are covered
in
Sections 6.4
and 6.5;
•
detailed
consideration of the de-Ba’athification of Iraqi institutions,
which can
be found
in Section 11;
•
the UK role
in the reconstruction of Iraq, and the reform of its Security
Sector,
set out in
Sections 10 and 12; and
•
the
provision of military equipment for use in Iraq, which is covered
in
Section 14.
•
Between 2003
and 2009, the UK’s most consistent strategic objective in relation
to
Iraq was to
reduce the level of its deployed forces.
•
The UK
struggled from the start to have a decisive effect on the Coalition
Provisional
Authority’s
policies, even though it was fully implicated in its decisions as
joint
Occupying
Power.
•
US and UK
strategies for Iraq began to diverge almost immediately after the
conflict.
Although
the differences were managed, by early 2007 the UK was finding it
difficult
to play
down the divergence, which was, by that point,
striking.
•
The UK missed
clear opportunities to reconsider its military approach
in
Multi‑National
Division (South-East).
•
Throughout
2004 and 2005 it appears that senior members of the Armed
Forces
reached the
view that little more would be achieved in MND(SE) and that it
would
make more
sense to concentrate military effort on Afghanistan where it might
have
greater
effect.
•
From July 2005
onwards, decisions in relation to resources for Iraq were made
under
the
influence of the demands of the UK effort in Afghanistan. Although
Iraq remained
the stated
UK main effort, the Government no longer had the option of a
substantial
reinforcement
of its forces there.
•
The UK’s plans
to reduce troop levels depended on the transition of
lead
responsibility
for security to the Iraqi Security Forces, even as the latter’s
ability
to take
on that responsibility was in question.
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