15.1 | Civilian
personnel
37.
The
recruitment of staff for the new Embassy was part of a wider
redeployment of
FCO staff
in response to developments in Iraq.
38.
On 20 March
2003, Sir Michael Jay informed Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign
Secretary,
that
“almost five percent of FCO staff in London” had been
redeployed:
•
51 staff
had been redeployed to the main Emergency Unit;
•
119 had
been redeployed to the Consular Emergency Unit;
•
the Iraq
Planning Unit (IPU) had been established;
•
the nucleus
of a mission in Baghdad had been prepared; and
•
FCO staff
had been seconded to ORHA and “other bodies”.24
39.
The creation
of the IPU, based in the FCO, and the activation of the two
FCO
Emergency
Units in London is addressed in Section 6.5.
40.
Mr Collecott
updated Mr Straw on preparations for the new Embassy on 21
March:
“Plans are
in place for a two‑phase re‑occupation of the site [of the former
British
Embassy] as
soon as hostilities are over, and military ordnance personnel
have
declared
the site safe … These plans have had to be made on the basis of
worst
case
assumptions – an insecure environment; no secure office buildings
or
accommodation
available off‑compound; no available utilities.” 25
41.
Mr Collecott
explained that, in phase one, five specially converted containers
would
arrive in
Kuwait on 26 March to be transported to Baghdad as soon as the
route was
safe. The
containers would provide living and office accommodation for a team
of four,
led by
Mr Chris Segar, a senior FCO official, and would be
self‑sufficient in power and
water.
Mr Segar’s team would have secure communications from the
outset.
42.
Phase two
would begin in the first week of May and involve installation of
a
protected
prefabricated flat pack Embassy, with its own water, drainage and
power
supply, and
secure living and working accommodation for 44 staff, including
close
protection
officers. Construction of the Embassy would take 12
weeks.
43.
Mr Collecott
explained that the timetable was based on transport by sea
and
land. The
FCO would be exposed to “a very awkward period” if Baghdad returned
to
“relative normality”
quickly and pressure mounted rapidly to expand the UK
presence.
Two or
three weeks could be saved if the flat pack containers and other
equipment were
flown into
Baghdad. The FCO was “keeping open the option of calling in a debt
with
the
Americans by asking them to transport the flat pack equipment and
containers to
Baghdad.
(The RAF are not at all sure they can help.)”
24
Minute Jay
to Secretary of State [FCO], 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq Contingency
Planning and Prioritisation’.
25
Minute
Collecott to Private Secretary [FCO], 21 March 2003, ‘A British
Embassy in Baghdad’.
251