4.2  |  Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

106.  The Assessment also stated:

• Iraq had a “limited number of long-range missiles … available”; the JIC

assessed “12-20 650km range Al Hussein missiles”.

• Iraq had produced more than 50 Al Samoud missiles with a range of 150km.

• Attacks on Coalition Forces in Kuwait would require Iraq to deploy short-range

missiles into the “No Drive Zone [south of the 32nd parallel – imposed in

resolution 949 (1994)]”.

• A pre-emptive missile attack on Israel was “less likely because it would show

Iraq had been lying about its retention of long-range missiles”.

107.  Although it had “little intelligence on Iraq’s CBW doctrine” and knew “little about

Iraq’s CBW work since late 1998”, the JIC judged it “likely that Saddam would order the

use of CBW against Coalition Forces at some point, probably after Coalition attacks had

begun”. Iraqi CBW use “would become increasingly likely the closer Coalition Forces

came to Baghdad. Military targets might include troop concentrations or important fixed

targets in rear areas such as ports and airfields.”

108.  Addressing the possibility of “Alternative scenarios and at the death” the

Assessment also stated:

• Saddam Hussein “might pursue an extreme course of action at an earlier stage”

if he judged it to be “worth the risk of providing the US with overt justification

to attack”.

• Unorthodox options might include “the early or pre-emptive use of CBW”;

“CBW terrorism: although Saddam probably lacks the capability to deploy

a sophisticated device, he could cause widespread panic”.

• “Should he feel his fate is sealed, Saddam’s judgement might change to ‘bring

the temple down’ on his enemies no matter what the cost”. At that stage,

“Saddam would order the unrestrained use of CBW against Coalition Forces,

supporting regional states and Israel, although he would face practical problems

of command and control, the loyalty of his commanders, logistics problems and

the availability of chemical and biological agents in sufficient quantities to be

effective and the means to deliver them.”

109.  The Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Butler

Report, stated:

“The Key Judgements … would rightly have been prepared on a precautionary

basis. Perhaps for that reason, we have observed that when set against the

intelligence on Iraqi programmes contained in advice to Ministers in March [2002],

the JIC assessment reflected more firmly the premise that Iraq had chemical and

biological weapons and would use them in war. Underpinning this must have been

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