4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

reports on Saddam Hussein’s intention to use chemical and biological weapons

if attacked.”127

273. The Butler Report stated that the “more definite judgements inside the

Assessment” were based on:

“… significant new intelligence in August and September 2002 … Four reports were

received in total, from three sources, which were influential … The first provided

material from a range of original informants reporting via an intermediary to the

source.128 We have noted, however, that the individual items from the informants did

not confirm directly that Iraq had chemical weapons. They came from senior Iraqi

officials who were believed at the time to have direct knowledge of Iraq’s intentions,

use, deployment or concealment of chemical weapons, but were based for most

of the informants on an assumption (not direct knowledge) that Iraq had such

weapons.”129

274. The Butler Report added:

“The second and third [reports] were from a source who had previously reported

reliably and who continued to do so in the following months. This source, too, could

not confirm from direct experience that Iraq had chemical weapons, resting on

reporting ‘common knowledge’ within his circle that chemical agent production was

taking place. The second report from this source seems to us to duplicate much

of the first.”130

275. The fourth intelligence report described in the Butler Report:

“… was a single report, from a reliable and established source reporting a

new subsource who did not subsequently provide any further reporting, which

was described as ‘confirming’ the intelligence on Iraqi mobile biological agent

production facilities received from the liaison service. Contrary to the JIC view at

the time, we believe that this report would have been more accurately described

as ‘complementary’ to, rather than ‘confirming’, it.”131

276. Mr Miller told the Inquiry that the intelligence reports were from:

• “one established and reliable source, which was quoting senior Iraqi officers,

[…], about the use of CBW”;

127 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 306.

128 “We were told by SIS during the course of our Review that there is now doubt about the reliability of this

reporting chain and hence of the reports derived from it. Section 5.9 provides further detail.”

129 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraphs 300-301.

130 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 302.

131 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 303.

165