The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
205.
The FCO judged
that:
“The wider
strategic consequences of a worst-case scenario like this would
be
appalling:
•
Iraq would
become a long-term source of instability in the region
…
•
Iraq could
become a permanent base for Al Qaida and Sunni Islamic
terrorism,
further
destabilising Saudi Arabia.
•
Jihadist
elements would declare victory and be strengthened, with
significant
implications
for the Global War on Terrorism and the prospects for
the
Arab‑Israeli
conflict.
•
Prospects for
reform in the Arab world could be set back a decade.
•
Having seen
the US fail, an increasingly self-confident Iran steps up
efforts
to become
the major regional power, accelerates its nuclear programme
and
triggers a
regional arms race.
•
Instability
causes oil prices to rise further.”
206.
The paper
concluded that scenario was a long way off. There was likely to
be
scope, even
with a significant “troops out majority” in the Transitional
National Assembly
(TNA), to
negotiate a phased withdrawal to mitigate the risk of a downward
spiral.
207.
The covering
letter from Mr Straw’s Private Secretary to Mr Blair’s
Private
Secretary
highlighted that Prime Minister Allawi might “take the sting out of
nationalists’
and Sunni
rejectionists’ grievances that the MNF-I (US presence) represents
indefinite
occupation
by a different name” by making an announcement about withdrawal
in
November.
The FCO and MOD would be working on a joint paper for discussion
with
the US
and then Prime Minister Allawi.
208.
On 12 October,
Mr Hoon wrote to Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General,
reporting
that the
security situation had deteriorated since transfer of sovereignty
in June.106
209.
While there
was no state of armed conflict between the UK and Iraq, the
MOD
believed
that a state of armed conflict existed between the IIG and certain
insurgent
groups
within Iraq. In Mr Hoon’s view, international humanitarian law
(IHL) would provide
a more
appropriate legal framework for UK forces operating within Iraq and
he therefore
considered
it necessary to activate the dormant provisions of the Targeting
Directive
which
allowed the Joint Commander to seek Ministerial approval to conduct
operations
governed by
the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). That would enable UK forces to
engage
certain
clearly defined insurgent groups under IHL and would also clarify
the position of
UK service
personnel embedded in the US command chain.
106
Letter Hoon
to Goldsmith, 12 October 2004, ‘Review of Legal Framework for UK
Forces and
for
‘embeds’.
430