The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

91. There is no official note of the meeting and none of the witnesses referred to it in

their evidence to the Inquiry.

92. Mr Brown and Mr Hoon met separately on 23 September to agree the process for

funding UORs for Iraq.71

93. Before the meeting, Mr Hoon was advised by Mr Guy Lester, MOD Director

Defence Resources and Plans, that it would make sense to use the arrangements in

place for Afghanistan: Ministers would agree a “ceiling” on UOR expenditure, within

which Treasury officials could authorise expenditure on individual requests without

seeking approval from Treasury Ministers.72 The MOD expected the first and most

urgent tranche of UORs to cost £150m.

94. Mr Watkins commented on that advice:

“We are told that Treasury officials are happy [to use the Afghanistan model], but

Mr Brown may want to clear them [UOR requests] individually himself. This would

create a major bureaucratic bottleneck.”73

95. Mr Watkins’ record of the 23 September meeting stated that Mr Brown’s “initial line”

was that he should approve each UOR individually, but “Mr Hoon persuaded him that

this would not be practical or sensible”.74

96. Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Brown on 25 September, to confirm their agreement that the

MOD would adopt a similar approach to managing Iraq UORs to that already in place for

Afghanistan UORs, with an initial ceiling of £150m.75 MOD and Treasury officials were

tasked to work out the detailed arrangements.

97. In response to a request from Mr Brown on “how to handle future requests for Iraq

UOR funding”, a Treasury official wrote to Mr Bowman on 8 October 2002, describing

how a UOR arrangement might operate and how the Treasury might “reduce the UOR

bill” by arguing that UORs were in fact generic enhancements of military capability,

and by ensuring that the MOD had not already planned to procure items presented

as UORs.76

98. The Inquiry has seen no evidence that Mr Brown had asked for advice on the

specific question of how to reduce the UOR bill.

71 Letter Hoon to Brown, 25 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Urgent Operational Requirements’.

72 Minute Lester to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the Chancellor:

23 September 2002’.

73 Manuscript comment Watkins to SoS [MOD], 20 September 2002, on Minute Lester to PS/Secretary

of State [MOD], 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the Chancellor: 23 September 2002’.

74 Minute Watkins to D Def RP, 23 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the Chancellor: 23 September’.

75 Letter Hoon to Brown, 25 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Urgent Operational Requirements’.

76 Minute Treasury [junior official] to Bowman, 8 October 2002, ‘Iraq – Urgent Operational Requirements –

Next Steps’.

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