The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
530.
Lord Bach’s
Private Office wrote alongside this point: “This is very serious.
It will
be impossible
to defend this adequately.”268
531.
On the front
page of Mr Flaherty’s advice, Lord Bach’s Private Office
wrote:
“This was
not flagged up through the chain of command, despite
(numerous)
assurances
that it would be, and it runs counter to the public lines Ministers
were
given.
These were effectively – although there are some shortfalls
(because NAIAD
is no
longer manufactured) – we have confidence in our NBC defence
against any
threat
posed by Saddam. In fact, the point contradicts this and has,
rather fittingly
in my
view, been described as ‘playing Russian roulette with people’s
lives.’”
532.
On
3 July, Lord Bach’s Private Office replied to Mr Flaherty
expressing alarm that
there were
occasions when personnel were assessed to be at high risk due to a
lack of
NBC
equipment:
“[Lord
Bach] recalls the assessments provided before the campaign that our
NBC
defence was
‘fragile’ but that nevertheless there was complete confidence in
the
NBC posture
of UK forces – as reflected in Lord Bach’s weekly UOR meetings
and
the
Department’s public line. In particular, whilst Lord Bach fully
appreciates the right
of
Commanders to make decisions on the ground, he is concerned that
Ministers
were not
made aware of this fact until it came to light through media
questions.”269
533.
On
3 October, an MOD report to ACM Bagnall explained that, while
the ‘Defence
Strategic
Audit and Guidance for the 2004 Equipment Programme’ had suggested
that
NBC
capabilities constituted “vital ground” to be protected in the
programme, its “high
impact/low
probability nature” had remained “an inhibiting factor regarding
resource
allocation”.270
However, a
“quick estimate on what might have happened”, on
operations
such as in
Iraq, had been carried out and the issues raised had been addressed
in
its report.
“A
recurrent theme emerging from our work is the need for culture
change and
an improved
understanding of CBRN defence from Front Line to grand
strategic;
attitudes
remain that CBRN is unlikely, too difficult, a Cold War issue, or
only a
problem for
specialists.”
535.
The team
recommended a number of “quick wins”, including policy updates,
more
training,
and preserving CBRN capabilities and research. In the longer term,
the report
advocated
ensuring that CBRN stock holdings met Defence Planning
Assumptions,
268
Manuscript
comment MOD [junior official] on Minute PJHQ J9 to PS/Minister(DP),
6 June 2003,
‘Iraq: Op
TELIC UORs’.
269
Minute
APS/Minister(DP) to PJHQ J9, 3 July 2003, ‘Op TELIC UORs: NBC
Equipment’.
270
Minute ACNS
to MA/VCDS, 3 October 2003, ‘CBRN – Tiger Team Final
Report’.
86