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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
387.  Publication of the document was postponed. The Cabinet Office was given
the responsibility of co-ordinating preparation of a public “dossier; Mr Campbell
was to “retain the lead” on its form and the timing of publication.
388.  Mr Miller sent “the latest version of the paper for public consumption setting out the
facts on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction” to Sir David Manning on 21 March.170 He
added: “The intelligence agencies here have had a final look at it.” The document also
incorporated earlier comments from the US.
389.  Mr Miller reported to Mr Scarlett that Mr Ricketts had “held a meeting of all
concerned” on 21 March and that, after the meeting, No.10 had “decided to delay
publication till a decent interval after Crawford”.171
390.  Mr Miller added: “There are nonetheless some points for us to consider”, including:
“Peter’s meeting was very concerned that our first paragraph on CBW … was
general figures, not the specific numbers used recently and for some time) by
the FCS [the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary]. I explained that the US
had asked for the change, not recognising the old figures, and that the DIS had
in any case recently amended their estimates. Peter planned to draw this to
Mr Straw’s attention. His Private Office … thought the paper should be delayed
until the figures were amended and issued in a PQ [Parliamentary Question].
We need to press the DIS to ensure they stand by their new figures …”
Sir David Manning would not show the paper to Dr Rice until Mr Blair had
approved it.
391.  The announcement of the revised estimates produced by the DIS is addressed
later in this Section.
392.  In a personal minute to Mr Straw on 22 March, Mr Ricketts wrote that there were
“two real problems” in supporting US objectives “which need discussing”.172 The first was
the threat from Iraq:
“The truth is what has changed is not the pace of Saddam’s WMD programmes,
but our tolerance of them post-11 September. This is not something we need to be
defensive about, but attempts to claim otherwise publicly will increase scepticism
about our case. I am relieved that you decided to postpone publication of the
unclassified document. My meeting yesterday showed there is more work to do to
ensure that the figures are accurate, and consistent with those of the US. But even
the best survey of Iraq’s WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent
years on the nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts: the programmes are extremely
worrying but have not, as far as we know, been stepped up.”
170  Minute Miller to Manning, 21 March 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes – Public Version’.
171  Note (handwritten) Miller to Scarlett, 21 March 2002, ‘Iraq: WMD’.
172  Minute Ricketts to Secretary of State [FCO], 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Advice for the Prime Minister’.
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