The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
387.
Publication
of the document was postponed. The Cabinet Office was
given
the
responsibility of co-ordinating preparation of a public “dossier;
Mr Campbell
was to
“retain the lead” on its form and the timing of
publication.
388.
Mr Miller
sent “the latest version of the paper for public consumption
setting out the
facts on
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction” to Sir David Manning on 21
March.170
He
added: “The
intelligence agencies here have had a final look at it.” The
document also
incorporated
earlier comments from the US.
389.
Mr Miller
reported to Mr Scarlett that Mr Ricketts had “held a
meeting of all
concerned”
on 21 March and that, after the meeting, No.10 had “decided to
delay
publication
till a decent interval after Crawford”.171
390.
Mr Miller
added: “There are nonetheless some points for us to consider”,
including:
•
“Peter’s
meeting was very
concerned
that our first paragraph on CBW … was
general
figures, not the specific numbers used recently and for some time)
by
the FCS
[the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary]. I explained that the
US
had asked
for the change, not recognising the old figures, and that the DIS
had
in any case
recently amended their estimates. Peter planned to draw this
to
Mr Straw’s
attention. His Private Office … thought the paper should be
delayed
until the
figures were amended and issued in a PQ [Parliamentary
Question].
We need to
press the DIS to ensure they stand by their new figures
…”
•
Sir David
Manning would not show the paper to Dr Rice until Mr Blair
had
approved
it.
391.
The
announcement of the revised estimates produced by the DIS is
addressed
later in
this Section.
392.
In a personal
minute to Mr Straw on 22 March, Mr Ricketts wrote that
there were
“two real
problems” in supporting US objectives “which need
discussing”.172
The first
was
the threat
from Iraq:
“The truth
is what has changed is not the pace of Saddam’s WMD
programmes,
but our
tolerance of them post-11 September. This is not something we need
to be
defensive
about, but attempts to claim otherwise publicly will increase
scepticism
about our
case. I am relieved that you decided to postpone publication of
the
unclassified
document. My meeting yesterday showed there is more work to do
to
ensure that
the figures are accurate, and consistent with those of the US. But
even
the best
survey of Iraq’s WMD programmes will not show much advance in
recent
years on
the nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts: the programmes are
extremely
worrying
but have not, as far as we know, been stepped up.”
170
Minute
Miller to Manning, 21 March 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes – Public
Version’.
171
Note
(handwritten) Miller to Scarlett, 21 March 2002, ‘Iraq:
WMD’.
172
Minute
Ricketts to Secretary of State [FCO], 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Advice
for the Prime Minister’.
84