The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
131.
The final
paragraph of the Embassy’s report highlighted the degree of
uncertainty
surrounding
US plans:
“In the
ensuing discussion, Feith said that military occupation could last
two years.
Both
admitted to ‘enormous uncertainties’. They said that they did not
know how the
Iraqi oil
industry would be managed, who would cover the costs of oil
installation
reconstruction,
or how the detailed transition to a democratic Iraq would
operate.
The
committee’s response was one of incredulity, with encouragement to
plan for
the worst,
as well as the best, case.”
132.
Sir David
Manning commented to Mr Bowen and No.10
officials:
“Last
para[graph] shows scale of problem post-Saddam. We must keep
pushing
for this
work to be done.”69
133.
Mr Tom
Dodd, Cabinet Office OD Sec, reported on 11 February on a US
briefing
on the oil
sector arranged by the Assessments Staff.70
The
briefing assessed that
Iraq’s oil
infrastructure was “generally in terrible condition”. CENTCOM
believed that
oil
production could be increased to 6m bpd within three years, given
massive new
investment.
US officials believed that reaching that level of production would
take
at least
six years, “given benign political and security
factors”.
134.
Mr Hoon
discussed post-conflict issues with Mr Donald Rumsfeld, the
US
Secretary
of Defense, in Washington on 12 February.
135.
A briefing
prepared by the MOD Iraq Secretariat for Mr Hoon listed
eight
“Key Gaps/US-UK
policy differences”, one of which was oil.71
136.
The MOD
advised that the US plan for the insertion of a task force of US
oil
experts and
subsequent management of Iraqi oilfields “had to be handled
carefully to
avoid
accusations of theft”. The UK would press for transparency of oil
management,
for greater
UN involvement than was envisaged, and for the early transfer of
control
of oilfields
back to the Iraqis.
137.
The “task
force” was probably a reference to Task Force Restore Iraq Oil
(RIO),
established
by the US Army Corps of Engineers.72
An advance
team from Task Force
RIO
deployed to Iraq in February.
69
Manuscript
comment Manning on Telegram 196 Washington to FCO, 12 February
2003, ‘Iraq ‘Day After’:
US Makes
Initial Planning Public’.
70
Minute Dodd
to Drummond, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Oil’.
71
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 February 2003,
‘Secretary of State’s Visit to
Washington:
Iraq’.
72
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
394