The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

909. The early discovery of two mobile trailers was the most significant find, but the

trailers’ use for BW production remained unproven.

910. The lack of evidence to support pre-conflict claims about Iraq’s WMD

challenged the credibility of the Government and the intelligence community, and

the legitimacy of the war.

911. The Government and the intelligence community were both concerned about

the consequences of the presentational aspects of their pre-war assessments

being discredited.

912. Although the US proposed the creation of the ISG in April, it was not launched

until 30 May. Mr Tenet appointed Dr Kay as the ISG’s first Head on 11 June and it was

another two months before Mr Scarlett was able to inform No.10 on 10 August that the

ISG was “fully operational”.

913. By June, the Government had acknowledged the need for a review of

the UK’s pre-conflict intelligence on Iraq. It responded to demands for an

independent, judge-led inquiry by expressing support for the reviews initiated by

the ISC and the FAC.

914. The announcement of the Hutton Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding

the death of Dr David Kelly on 18 July reinforced the Government’s position that

additional reviews were not needed.

915. The Government maintained that position until January 2004, backed

by three votes in the House of Commons (on 4 June, 15 July and 22 October)

rejecting a succession of Opposition motions calling for an independent inquiry

into the use of pre-war intelligence.

916. Mr Blair’s initial response to growing criticism of the failure to find WMD was

to counsel patience.

917. In Washington on 17 July, Mr Blair told the media that he believed “with every

fibre of instinct and conviction” that he would be proved right about the threat from Iraqi

WMD, but that it was important to wait for the ISG to complete its work.

918. In his Interim Report to Congress on 2 October, Dr Kay stated that the ISG had

not found stocks of weapons. He judged that, although it was “far too early” to reach

definitive conclusions, Saddam Hussein “had not given up his aspirations and intentions

to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction”.

919. Despite finding that Saddam Hussein had breached Security Council resolutions

and that he had intended to restart his WMD programmes as soon as he was able, the