The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
324.
Lord Bach was
advised:
“Whilst
there are no showstoppers it should be understood that lack of some
UOR
capabilities
… could require Commanders to make choices they might not
otherwise
have to
make and could reduce operational effectiveness. Equally, delivery
of the
UOR
capability cannot remove risks completely. The overall operational
impact may
be to
constrain commanders’ options, reduce the tempo of operations and
risk the
ability to
operate in close conjunction with US forces.”
325.
In response to
the high level of media and Parliamentary interest in the
availability
of
equipment, as a general guideline, one of the points to emphasise
was that:
“Our forces
will have the equipment they need to undertake any tasks
assigned
to them as
part of possible operations. The safety and well-being of our
Service
personnel
are of paramount importance. Where appropriate, we should look
to
compare
capabilities to those available in the 1991 Gulf War.”
326.
Details of the
key shortfalls were provided in an annex, which largely reflected
the
advice to
Gen Walker of 21 January. Additional information
included:
•
As 3
Commando Brigade and deploying RAF personnel had been fully
equipped
with desert
clothing, there were “no remaining stocks”. An additional 32,500
sets
would be
delivered on 7 March and the full requirement would be
available on
28 March.
It would need to be airlifted into theatre.
•
Sufficient
ECBA plates would be available “to equip the entire force” by
7 March
and there
was confidence that “the full ECBA capability” could be
delivered
“before the
committal of any ground troops”.
•
The
unavailability of COLPRO for AFVs remained the same, although
the
Defence
Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) had provided advice
that
reduced the
number of filter changes required “while maintaining
sufficient
protection
for the crew”. Even the reduced number could not be resourced
and
“the
limited in-service stocks” would “therefore require
prioritisation”.
327.
On the same
day, as instructed at the Chiefs of Staff meeting on
22 January,
Air Chief
Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger, Chief of Defence Logistics (CDL),
wrote to
Adm Boyce
about which capability and sustainability UORs were unavailable
within
current
timelines.156
Those were
listed in an annex which was consistent with other
briefings
on the shortfalls.
328.
Referring to
the inability to approach industry earlier and the constraint
placed
upon funds
while arrangements were agreed with the Treasury, ACM Pledger
stated
that
Adm Boyce should be aware of “the relative success” that had
been achieved by
the DLO.
156
Minute CDL
to PSO/CDS, 24 January 2003, ‘UOR/Operational Sustainability
Issues’.
50