The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
a regime
less intrusive than the last one.” After the adoption of the GRL,
the prospect of
lifting
sanctions would be less enticing for Iraq:
“A
continuing threat of US action … was needed to influence Iraqi
behaviour,
whatever
some might think of the consequences of the threat.”
79.
A French
official agreed, adding:
“… if the
fear of US intervention receded, there would be no co-operation at
all from
the Iraqis,
which in turn would strengthen the hands of the hawks in
Washington.”
80.
The personal
view of the French official was:
“… we would
be in exactly the same position on Iraq in five years’ time – and
that
would
represent the least bad option, given the regional instability that
would ensue
from any
military action.”
81.
The paragraph
on France’s views of the UN authority for military action was
drawn
to the
attention of Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, with the comment
that it was:
“An
important statement from a Permanent Member of the
UNSC.”41
82.
Mr Hoon
advised Mr Blair on 31 May that he and Mr Straw had agreed
a
preliminary
UK objective to guide planning which, rather than calling directly
for
the
elimination of Iraq’s WMD capability, called on Iraq to abide by
its international
obligations
on WMD.
83.
The first
meeting of the Pigott Group in late April considered how to define
the
objective,
or “end state” of a military operation.42
Mr Ricketts
advised Mr Straw:
“As we
found in the run-up to the Afghanistan operation, defining the
objective of an
operation
is crucial … The MOD had tried their hand at a definition of the
‘end-state’
which was
discussed at length, and I undertook to produce a further
version.
“I have now
done so … it would be helpful to know whether the Foreign
Secretary
thinks we
are on the right lines. At this stage, it is only to inform MOD
contingency
planning:
at the right point, these issues would have to be negotiated
carefully and
at a high
level with the Americans, who will have their own priorities. My
proposal
is as
follows:
– ‘A stable
and law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, co-operating with
the
international
community, no longer posing a threat to global security or to
its
neighbours,
and abiding by its international obligations on control of its
WMD.’”
41
Manuscript
comment [Paul Berman] to AG, [undated], on Telegram 337 Paris to
FCO London,
28 May 2002,
‘Iraq: Quai’s Views’.
42
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 25 April 2002, ‘Iraq:
Contingency Planning’.
18