The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
authorisation”.
Sir Kevin’s proposal “would be one way of achieving this:
though the
timetable
looks a bit leisurely”.208
509.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair, through Mr Powell, that he
should have an
early
meeting to discuss the issues.209
511.
At Cabinet
on 6 March, Mr Blair concluded that it was for the Security
Council
to
determine whether Iraq was co-operating fully.
512.
Summing up the
discussion at Cabinet on 6 March, Mr Blair said it was
“the
responsibility
of the Chief Inspectors to present the truth about Saddam
Hussein’s
co-operation
with the United Nations, so that the Security Council could
discharge its
responsibilities
in making the necessary political decisions”. The UK was “lobbying
hard
in favour
of the draft Security Council resolution”. It was the duty of
Saddam Hussein to
co-operate
fully, “and it was for the Security Council to determine whether
that had been
513.
A revised
resolution was tabled in the Security Council on 7 March (See the
Box
below).
514.
Mr Straw
asked, on behalf of the UK, US and Spain as co-sponsors, for a
revised
draft of
the second resolution to be circulated.212
The draft
resolution recalled the provisions of previous Security Council
resolutions on
Iraq and
noted that:
•
The Council
had “repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences
as
a result
of its continued violations of its obligations”; and
•
Iraq had
“submitted a declaration … containing false statements and
omissions
and has
failed to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation
of, that
resolution”.
The draft
stated that the Council:
•
“Mindful of
its primary responsibility under the Charter … for the maintenance
of
international
peace and stability;
208
Manuscript
comment Jay to Ricketts, 5 March 2003, on Letter Tebbit to
Turnbull, 5 March 2003,
[untitled].
209
Manuscript
comment Manning to Powell and Prime Minister, 6 March 2003, on
Letter Tebbit to Turnbull,
5 March
2003, [untitled].
210
Manuscript
comment Prime Minister to Manning, on Letter Tebbit to Turnbull, 5
March 2003, [untitled].
211
Cabinet
Conclusions, 6 March 2003.
212
Telegram
378 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Draft
Resolution’.
92