3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
253.
Ms Adams
advised Lord Goldsmith that she did not think the letter disclosed
any
new issues
and there was “no particular deadline” for a response. Mr Wood
had offered
to discuss
the issues if Lord Goldsmith wished.83
254.
Lord Goldsmith
met Mr Wood and Mr Grainger on 27
September.84
255.
There is no
record of the meeting but Ms Adams prepared a draft reply
to
Mr Wood,
which did not differ materially from the views expressed in
Mr Wood’s
letter
of 24 September. Lord Goldsmith saw it before the meeting, but
it was not sent.
A manuscript
note by Ms Adams recorded that Lord Goldsmith had “indicated
agreement
with
substance” of the draft.85
256.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Lord Goldsmith wrote that he had
responded
to Mr Wood’s
request during a meeting on 27 September:
“I gave him
my view of the text and what would be necessary to achieve
our
objectives
in the various different scenarios that he posed. The text at that
stage
provided
that failure by Iraq at any time to comply and co‑operate fully
with the
provisions
of the draft resolution would constitute a further material breach
and that
such a
breach authorised member states to use all necessary means to
restore
international
order. I believe I said that if the draft resolution was adopted …
it
would
constitute a clear statement by the Security Council that Member
States
were
authorised to take measures, including the use of force … I believe
that I went
on to say
though that the use of force would have to be directed towards
securing
compliance
with Iraq’s disarmament obligations and any force would have to
be
a necessary
and proportionate response to the breach of the
resolution.”86
257.
France and
Russia immediately raised serious concerns about the
approach
in the
draft resolution and in particular the draft of OP10 and whether it
would
“trigger”
or permit “automatic” military action without a specific decision
of the
Security
Council.
258.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that two resolutions might be
needed:
•
The primary
objective for the first would be “unequivocal powers
for
inspections
and hurdles for Iraq”.
•
There would
be “differing views about what constituted an Iraqi sin
of
sufficient
gravity to trigger a second resolution authorising
force”.
83
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 26 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Request for
Advice’.
84
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 27 September 2002, ‘Security Council
Resolution on Iraq: Request
for
Advice’.
85
Manuscript
comment Adams, 27 September 2002, on Letter [draft] to Wood, ‘Iraq:
Use of Force’.
86
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraph 1.16.
247