The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
e.
Note
that some
US thinking now sees a role for HQ ARRC as a follow-on
HQ
for
post-conflict Iraq …
f.
Agree
that if the
political gains are sufficient, we should entertain a role in
Iraq
for HQ ARRC
– but
note that a
countrywide military remit for HQ ARRC (ie as
HQ CJTF-I)
risks the UK assuming too great a proportion of the
responsibility
for the
stability and security of Iraq from the US …”
405.
The MOD warned
that:
“Once fully
deployed the level of our commitment to Op TELIC will be large
scale
across all
three services. Unless very significant risk is to be placed on the
deployed
force, and
UK forces more widely, the force must be reduced to medium
scale
by
October/November this year; this implies that the reduction must
begin by
July/ August.
Factors that drive this conclusion are:
a.
A large
scale commitment can only be sustained with the callout of
certain
trade
groups of reserves, who have already been mobilised in
toto.
b.
There will
be severe disruption of the Formation Readiness Cycle
and
Operational
Commitments Plot that will have deleterious effects on
training
and wider
capability in the medium to long term.
c.
A longer
deployment at large scale would imply a breach of
Harmony
Guidelines144
for a very
significant number of Service Personnel which may
lead to a
marked reduction in morale, retention and, eventually recruitment
…
“Once
reduced to medium scale – all other things being equal – it would
be possible
to maintain
a medium scale commitment to Iraq indefinitely … though this would,
of
course,
constrain our ability to take on other new tasks. Such a commitment
would,
however, be
extremely expensive …”
406.
In “pure
military terms”, assuming that there was a “rapid and
successful
conclusion
to the conflict and a
permissive environment”, the UK
would only be able
to
“support” the proposed AOR in southern Iraq until August. Beyond
that there would
need to be
“substantial Coalition support”. Without it, the UK could be left
with “an
unsustainable
commitment”. The area currently proposed included “a very
substantial
proportion
of the Iraqi population, a substantial oilfield content and
responsibility for key
religious
sites”.
407.
At the Chiefs
of Staff meeting on 19 February, Lt Gen Reith reported that Mr
Blair
wanted:
“… an
exemplary aftermath but [was] not committed to any particular size
of UK
AOR pending
further advice on objectives, capability and capacity to sustain.
It was
… unclear
who the US anticipated placing as sector leaders given that few
other
144
Harmony
Guidelines are explained in Section 16.1.
446