The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
identified
would have gone from theatre to CJO and, if required, onwards
to
DCDS(C) or
DCDS(EC) and their staffs. I do not recall any shortfalls being
identified
to me at
the start of the campaign although issues emerged later as the
operation
521.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry that he had not been told about the
commanders’
decisions
to redistribute body armour:
“My
understanding was everybody had body armour. Whether there was a
sufficient
number of
enhanced body armour kits was something which didn’t percolate out
–
and the
need to redistribute such that appeared in theatre wasn’t something
which
percolated
up to the Chiefs of Staff.”264
522.
Risks were
taken with the levels of protection against the use of
chemical
or biological
weapons.
523.
In its
Lessons for
the Future report in
December 2003, the MOD stated there had
been
“localised shortages” of NBC equipment, such as suits, “again
caused by sizing
difficulties
or equipment distribution and tracking problems”.265
The MOD
added:
“Other
shortfalls were due to poor stock maintenance – for example the
inspection
regime for
Residual Vapour Detectors had not been followed, leading to
uncertainty
over
serviceability. Nevertheless, through a combination of purchasing
spare parts
and
rigorous re-testing of the equipment, the operational requirement
was met.”
524.
Rear Admiral
Michael Wood, MOD DLO Director General Operations,
visited
Iraq between
10 and16 May to ascertain the logistic support issues that had
emerged
in theatre.266
In his
report to ACM Pledger on 20 May, he highlighted the
shortage
of NBC
equipment:
“The one
significant area of weakness and concern emphasised by all the
senior
Land
Component commanders I met was NBC equipment and
preparedness.
Whilst …
the threat did not manifest itself, the lack of crucial items of
detection
and
protection equipment and consumables undermined the confidence of
those
preparing
to go to war.”
263
Statement,
6 January 2011, page 5.
264
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 44.
265
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003.
266
Minute CDL
to VCDS, 27 May 2003, ‘Visit by DG Ops (DLO) to Op TELIC:
10-16 May 2003’ attaching
Minute Wood
to Pledger, 20 May 2003, ‘Op TELIC Trip Report –
10-16 May 2003’.
84