The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

167. Secretary Rumsfeld and Mr Hoon met again at Heathrow Airport before Secretary

Rumsfeld returned to the US.84

168. Mr Hoon said that the UK had not seen significant output from the debriefing

of high-value individuals and scientists. There could be information emerging that

was of operational use and should be shared with commanders on the ground.

Secretary Rumsfeld agreed that this was an area that could be improved.

169. Mr Straw raised verification with Mr Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of

State, on 6 May.85 The key question was: “did the US want UNMOVIC back in?” The

issue could not be sidestepped indefinitely. Mr Armitage said that he was not keen.

170. In discussion at the AHMGIR on 8 May, Mr Hoon stated that, given the role WMD

had played in the justification for action against Saddam Hussein, it would be important

to link any finds back to the pre-conflict evidence.86

171. Other points made were that:

• Military action was justified by the continued failure of the Iraqi Government to

meet its obligations set out in UN resolutions.

• If the UK Government faced criticism if further WMD were not found, the

response should be that Saddam Hussein could have avoided war by, for

example, delivering scientists.

• If the Security Council had held together, there might not have been a need for war.

172. Mr Straw concluded that it would be some time before WMD investigation would

produce clear results.

173. Mr Straw told Sir David Manning that the absence of any reference to UNMOVIC

inspectors in the text of the draft omnibus resolution being discussed on Iraq

(see Section 9.1) meant “we were very exposed on the question of why UNMOVIC

was not on the bus”.87

174. On 8 May 2003, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC)

announced a review into the intelligence and assessments that informed the

decision to invade Iraq and whether the intelligence was accurately reflected in

Government publications.

175. In its Annual Report for 2002/03, presented to Mr Blair on 8 May 2003, the ISC

stated: “It is impossible at the present moment to make any definitive statements about

the role of intelligence and the situation in Iraq.” The ISC had been briefed on the issue,

84 Minute Williams to Policy Director, [undated], ‘Visit of the US Secretary of Defense – 2 May 2003’.

85 Letter Sinclair to Manning, 7 May 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Meeting with US Deputy Secretary of State,

6 May’.

86 Minutes, 8 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

87 Letter Straw to Manning, 7 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversations with Colin Powell, 7 May’.

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