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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
36.  The paper listed likely immediate, medium-term and long-term military post-conflict
tasks. The immediate (up to six months) tasks included:
assist in restoration of key infrastructure elements;
secure oilfields and oil distribution/refining infrastructure.”
37.  The medium-term (six months to two years) tasks included:
begin transfer [of] security of oilfields and production facilities to Iraqi forces.”
38.  The paper was revised five times between June and December 2002.
The December 2002 version of the paper replaced the tasks listed above with a
single “Military Line of Operation” for infrastructure security, which extended into
the long term.19
39.  At his request, Mr Blair received a pack of reading material on Iraq at the beginning
of August 2002.
40.  The reading pack included a January 2002 DIS report on Iraq’s infrastructure.20
The report had been produced in response to the ongoing requirement on DIS to
maintain and update information to support possible future military operations.
41.  The DIS report stated that Iraq’s oil and gas industry had suffered substantial
damage during the Iran/Iraq and Gulf wars, and recovery had been slow. A “recent
UN report” had assessed that the general state of the Iraqi oil industry had declined
seriously over the previous 18 months and that urgent measures were needed to avoid
further deterioration of oil wells and the petroleum infrastructure. Of the 12 oil refineries
in Iraq, only three were operational.
42.  An FCO Economic Adviser produced an assessment of short- and long-term
economic consequences of military action for the region and for Iraq on 29 August.21
The assessment identified a number of potential short-term consequences of military
action including a rise in oil prices and the disruption of the OFF programme.
43.  Copies of the assessment were sent to FCO officials and, separately, to TPUK.
The Inquiry has seen no indication that copies were sent to other departments.
44.  A Treasury official sent Mr Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, a paper
on the global, regional and local (Iraqi) economic impact of war in Iraq on 6 September.22
19 Paper [SPG], 13 December 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’.
20 Paper DIS, 18 January 2002, ‘Infrastructure Briefing Memorandum: Iraq’.
21 Minute FCO [junior official] to Gray, 29 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Economic Issues Raised by Military Action
and Regime Change’ attaching Paper, [undated], ‘Regional Economic Consequences of Military Action
against Iraq’.
22 Email Treasury [junior official] to Bowman, 6 September 2002, ‘What would be the economic impact of
a war in Iraq?’ attaching Paper Treasury, September 2002, ‘What would be the economic impact of war
in Iraq?’.
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