The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
944.
Sir Roderic
had reported on 27 February that: “Influenced by Paris and
Berlin”,
Russia’s
position was hardening and it “largely agreed with” President
Chirac. The policy
was “to
stay with (and behind) the French and Germans while trying not to
antagonise
the
Americans”. Russia recognised that US action was “not far off”:
“Their preferred
option is
to prevent nine positive votes and thus avoid an awkward choice on
the veto.”
Russia was
“unlikely to be the first to break ranks”, and it seemed
“far-fetched” to
conceive of
Russia “helping the UK to get the swing votes [in the Security
Council]”.292
“In the
political class, almost everyone would vote for endless containment
rather
than
conflict. US arguments for bringing this to a head are not
accepted. There
is
nervousness about the wider consequences. US policy is seen as
potentially
dangerous,
and part of a right wing ‘axis-of-evil’ agenda … no-one to the
right of the
Communists
is arguing that Russia should obstruct the Americans. The
prevailing
mood is
that Russia should not endorse the war, but should stand to one
side …”
946.
President
Putin “would find it very hard to justify internally a vote in
favour of war,
absent a
smoking gun or a Security Council near-consensus”. The Russians did
“worry
about the
UN’s authority”; but they did not “buy our argument that this
obliges them
to support
the US regardless”. They would “prefer it if we were forced not to
put our
resolution
to the vote”.
947.
Sir Roderic
concluded:
“The best,
and probably the only, chance of getting the Russians
onside
without a
smoking gun would be for [President] Bush to spell out
personally
to [President] Putin
that support for the resolution will determine the
future
of the US/Russian relationship.”
948.
Mr Ivanov
told Mr Straw on 4 March that Russia had failed in an attempt
to
persuade
Saddam Hussein to leave and it would veto a resolution based on
the
draft
circulated on 24 February. President Bush had already decided to go
to war.
949.
Mr Straw
reported that he had told Mr Ivanov that the
international
community
had no choice but to pay attention to President Bush’s
priorities.
950.
During his
visit to London on 4 and 5 March, Mr Ivanov informed
Mr Straw that
Mr Yevgeny
Primakov, the former Russian Prime Minister, had just visited
Baghdad in
a failed
attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to leave.293
Russia, and
others, would
veto the
resolution tabled on 24 February. Mr Ivanov also expressed
doubts about
claims that
military action in Iraq would be quick.
292
Telegram 68
Moscow to FCO London, 27 February 2003, ‘Ivanov’s Visit to London:
Iraq’.
293
Telegram 37
FCO London to Moscow, 3 [sic] March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Meetings with
Russian
Foreign Minister, 4 March’.
352