The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
753.
In his weekly
report on 17 April, Major General Barney White‑Spunner,
GOC
MND(SE)
from February 2008 to August 2008, wrote that one of the lessons
learned
about
“MiTTing” was that the MiTT teams “must have the same mobility as
their Iraqi
partners”.402
Maj Gen White‑Spunner
said that AFVs were perceived as “too aggressive
(by both
the Iraqi leadership and by Basrawis)” and whilst the Mastiff had a
reduced
profile, it
was “still too large” to manoeuvre around “a complex urban
environment”.
He described
it as “an elephant compared to the Humvees of the US and
Iraqis”.
754.
Maj Gen White‑Spunner
wrote that “the mobility challenges presented by
Mastiff”
also
increased the risk of it being “vulnerable to attack”. He
concluded: “There is an
urgent
requirement to consider if there are protected mobility vehicles
that might best
suit this
task, although we are now clear that the solution is not
Humvees.”
755.
On 20 April,
the EC Branch in MND(SE) submitted a USUR for an “urban”
PPV
that
provided better manoeuvrability around Basra City than what was
possible with the
existing,
larger PPVs.403
756.
The USUR
stated that both Warrior and Bulldog were considered to be
unsuitable
because
tracked vehicles were unable to operate in urban areas. There was a
concern
that
Bulldog would “be considered as a tank” and affect the local
perception about the
nature of
the tasks being undertaken.
757.
The USUR
described Mastiff as being used “through necessity, not
choice”
because of
restrictions on Warrior and Snatch. Mastiff’s size, kerb weight
and
manoeuvrability
made it unsafe in urban areas. Snatch was assessed as
providing
insufficient
force protection.
758.
On Snatch the
USUR said:
“There
would be political concern associated with the use of SN2A [Snatch
2A] in
the city.
SN2A was withdrawn from use in the city in 2006 due to the high
rate of
fatalities
when vehicles were attacked. The equipment is not suitable for the
task
in its
current form and is not considered further.”
759.
The EC Branch
identified the Cougar Ridgback as its preferred solution; US
MiTTs
were using
the US version of the Ridgback, the Cougar 4x4, and “generally” did
not
have any
problems accessing Iraqi Army units within the city. It also had
good levels
of protection
and some commonality with the Mastiff.
760.
In reviewing
the potential vehicle solutions, the EC Branch said that the
Australian
Bushmaster
had good protection and mobility comparable with the Ridgback
but
required
“another Foreign Sales agreement”, had no commonality with the
Mastiff and
the
Australian fleet was being withdrawn in June 2008.
402
Minute
White‑Spunner to CJO, 17 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter –
17 April 2008’.
403
Minute ECB
MND(SE), 20 April 2008, ‘Op TELIC – Urgent Statement of User
Requirement for a Urban
Protected
Patrol Vehicle (UPPV).
130