The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the
incidents, reminding Iraq of its obligations and its support for
UNSCOM’s efforts
to implement
its mandate.130
298.
Mr Ekéus
wrote to the President of the Security Council again on
12 June to report
Iraq’s
decision to deny UNSCOM access to three sites on 10 and
12 June.131
299.
In a response
on 15 June, Mr Aziz set out at length Iraq’s “serious and
real
concerns
relating to Special Commission inspection teams’ access to sites”
which were
“important”
to Iraq’s “sovereignty or national security”.132
300.
Mr Aziz
stated that, following their agreement of 22 June 1996, he had
agreed
with
Mr Ekéus in October that “joint work should concentrate on
reviewing” the missile,
chemical
and biological files in turn, and “working to close them”. UNSCOM
had,
however,
“altered” that approach when it “began to carry out large-scale
inspections, the
likes of
which had not been conducted for several years” in March 1997. The
inspections
were based
“on the pretext of verifying alleged claims of the concealment of
proscribed
items and
activities” from the “intelligence sources of some States which
provide the
Special
Commission with such fabricated information”. Those sources were
“tendentious
and
inaccurate”.
301.
In addition,
Mr Aziz wrote that Iraq had “serious concern” that the
facilities available
to UNSCOM
were being used as “a cover to detect the arrangements made for
the
security of
Iraq, its leadership and the personnel involved”. Mr Aziz was
particularly
concerned
about the activities of Colonel Scott Ritter, a UN inspector and
serving
member of
the US Army.
302.
Mr Aziz
stressed that:
•
Allegations
concerning concealment of proscribed items were “false”,
and
UNSCOM had
“no concrete evidence to substantiate them”.
•
Iraq had
“pointed out … that limited operations of no practical value were
carried
out in 1991
by Hussein Kamil and a very small number of
individuals”.
•
The “facts
and information related to those operations” had been made
available
to UNSCOM,
and it had interviewed the personnel involved and visited the
sites
of concealment
“over a period of several months”.
•
Iraq
suspected that the aim was “to keep matters in a state of flux, and
justify the
endless
continuation of the embargo”, which served “the well-known
purposes
of a certain
State”.
130
UN Security
Council, ‘3789th Meeting Friday 13 June 1997’
(S/PV.3789).
131
UN Security
Council, 19 June 1997, ‘Letter dated 12 June 1997 from
the Executive Chairman of the
Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security
Council
resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security
Council’ (S/1997/474).
132
UN Security
Council, 16 June 1997, ‘Letter dated 16 June 1997 from
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
addressed
to the President of the Security Council’
(S/1997/465).
76