The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The point
of decision had arrived. It had been an agonising process going
through
the UN. But
the justification had been that we had to look at every alternative
before
turning to
military action. We should now be prepared to explain that
continued
non-compliance
by Saddam Hussein could not be met by another
discussion.
We had made
every effort … We had to explain yet again that unless
there
was
effective pressure on Saddam, he would never comply. Yet the French
and
Russians
made it impossible to bring that pressure to bear. We should now
engage
in a last
round of final contacts, and appeal to the Security Council to take
its
responsibilities seriously.”
682.
Mr Blair
added there was “24 hours to assess whether there had been
a
fundamental
change … If not … we should be ready for military action”. He would
be
content to
ask Sir Jeremy Greenstock to take the draft resolution off the
table “tomorrow
morning ‘if
there had been no lightning strike’. He would do so on behalf of
the
three co‑sponsors.”
683.
Mr Blair
stated that the role of the UN in post-conflict Iraq must be
defined
very carefully:
“We must
give the impression that the administration was under UN
authority.
The clearer
the UN role, the better. It was vital that UK public opinion
understood
that we
were not taking possession of Iraq’s oil.”
684.
Mr Blair
also stated that the UN should be seen to give overall
authorisation but it
could
certainly not run everything. He wanted the UN Security Council to
remain seized
of the
Iraqi issue.
685.
The record of
the discussion was to be seen by Mr Straw and Mr Hoon and
their
Principal
Private Secretaries.
•
“Bush
talked about it being a last effort. But he said it was important
the world
saw we were
making every effort to enforce 1441. He said everyone had
to
be able to
say we did everything we could to avoid war. But this was the
final
moment, the
moment of truth, which was the line most of the media ran
with.
He stressed
he wanted the UN to play an important role in the
post-Saddam
era. He was
clear we had to emphasise Iraq’s territorial integrity. He
was
emphasising
he really would move on MEPP. He said again TB had been right
to
push him on
the Road Map, and said he intended to spend a lot of time on
this.
He said re
Chirac ‘I don’t want to provoke him into unreasonableness.’ He
was
however
keen to say he wanted the UN properly involved in the
post-Saddam
era
…”
518