The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
837.
On 18 July, a
junior MOD official wrote to Dr Reid, stating that the
Chairman of the
PAC had
“expressed dissatisfaction with the shortcuts we took to gaining
parliamentary
approval”
for the first three tranches and that “a couple of backbench MPs”
had
objected.798
The
official considered the final tranche “less likely” to generate
objections
because it
did “not contain any weapons” but:
“We will
need to explain why we have again been unable to allow Parliament
to
consider
this gifting as fully as some MPs might wish.”
838.
The official
wrote that an additional £58m was likely to be needed for the
year
ahead: £38m
for OSIRIS II (protected and other mobility, infrastructure
construction
for forces
training, communications, logistics and command and control
functions) and
£20m for a
Civil Effects Fund. He recommended that Dr Reid propose that
expenditure
to the
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, now Mr Des Browne. He also
noted that Project
OSIRIS had
“been an understated success story” that should be highlighted in
the
presentation
plan for operational transition.
839.
As advised,
Dr Reid wrote to Mr Browne on 19 July stating that the
additional
£58m was
“central to the success of our plans”.799
Air Marshal
Glenn Torpy, Chief of Joint Operations, wrote to General Sir
Michael Walker,
CDS, on 10
November 2004 about the interim Force Level Review conducted
for
Operation
TELIC (see Section 14.1).800
AM Torpy
stated that the training, mentoring and
monitoring
of the NIA and ING was one of three emerging tasks from the review.
All three
tasks were
discretionary for the UK but not for MNF‑I and if other Troop
Contributing
Nations did
not undertake them, they could fall to the UK.
AM Torpy
wrote that the new tasks could be conducted by a battalion plus
senior mentors,
“possibly
of one‑star rank”, and work was under way to confirm the
requirement. He had
agreed with
Lt Gen Rollo that the work should be delayed until after the
election. AM
Torpy
advised that “for force generation purposes we should assume that
this is a new –
potentially
enduring” task.
Mr Roger
Cornish, MOD Deputy Director Iraq, wrote to Mr Hoon about the
review on
19 November.801
He
reiterated AM Torpy’s assessment of the training task, assessing
that
the force
package needed to undertake it would be 650 personnel in
total.
Mr Naworynsky
replied to Mr Cornish on 24 November, stating that
Mr Hoon had noted
798
Minute MOD
[junior official] to APS/SofS [MOD], 18 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Funding
for Security Sector
Reform and
a Civil Effects Fund for MND(SE)’.
799
Letter Reid
to Browne, 19 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Funding for Security Sector Reform
and for a Civil Effects
Fund for
MND(SE)’.
800
Minute CJO
to CDS, 10 November 2004, ‘Iraq – Interim Force Level
Review’.
801
Minute
Cornish to APS/SofS [MOD], 19 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Interim Force
Level Review’.
802
Minute
Naworynsky to Cornish, 24 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Interim Force Level
Review’.
246