The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
538.
Maj Gen Dayton
announced during an ISG video conference on 21 October
that
counter-terrorism
had been given equal status with WMD in the ISG’s work, but that
no
extra US
resources were being made available.294
539.
On
22 October, Mr Howard informed the Chiefs of Staff of the
ISG’s decision.295
540.
Mr Oakden
reported that the UK contribution to the ISG would gradually change
to
include a
counter-terrorism element.296
541.
On
30 October, Op ROCKINGHAM reported another IED attack on an
ISG convoy:
“Although
the number of ISG missions attacked is still small, and no serious
injuries
have yet
been sustained, the incidents do appear to be occurring more
frequently.”297
542.
Mr Howard
told the JIC Sub-Committee on Iraq/WMD on 4 November that
a
number of
US document exploitation experts, case officers and analysts were
being
diverted to
counter-terrorism work.298
Maj Gen
Dayton was reported to be satisfied that
this could
happen without damaging the WMD effort; Dr Kay was less sure. DIS
would
be
deploying some analysts shortly “who could be applied to either
target”.
543.
Mr Scarlett
and Mr Dowse expressed concern about an apparent loss of
ISG
momentum
since the Interim Report. Op ROCKINGHAM reports were “very thin
these
days”.
544.
Members of the
Sub-Committee agreed that media interest had moved on
from
WMD,
pending publication of the Hutton Report. The BBC
Panorama report on
the ISG
would air
on 29 November. SIS reported that the programme would focus
heavily on
missiles,
but also show the difficult conditions under which the ISG was
working.
545.
On
11 November, Mr Howard reported to Mr Scarlett that
the ISG’s “operational
tempo
remains at a very high level, though some site missions have been
postponed
due to the
increased security threat. The ISG functional teams are all
continuing
to conduct
debriefing and site exploitation operation.”299
There had
also been a
considerable
increase in the ability to exploit documents and different media
formats.
546.
Mr Howard
added that the apparent reduction in reporting was the result of
the
move away
from large-scale acquisition of data characteristic of the initial
months of
operation.
Staff turnover and fatigue had also contributed. Measures were in
hand to
address
that. The DIS had now “lowered reporting thresholds” for Op
ROCKINGHAM
daily and
weekly reports so that they reflected better the tempo of
activity.
294
Op
ROCKINGHAM Weekly No.19, 17-23 October 2003.
295
Minutes,
22 October 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
296
Minute
Oakden to Chatterton Dickson, 22 October 2003, ‘Chiefs of
Staff: 22 October: Iraq’.
297
Op
ROCKINGHAM Daily, 30 October 2003.
298
Minute
Dowse to Ehrman, 4 November 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD: JIC Sub-Group,
4 November’.
299
Letter
Howard to Scarlett, 11 November 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD: ISG
Progress’.
532