9.3 | July 2004 to May 2005

our job well) security culminating point. But a failure to build adequate capacity in

the interim would leave the first constitutionally-elected Iraqi government at severe

risk from an entrenched insurgency, and without the structures and security forces

to combat that insurgency effectively.”

157. Lt Gen McColl advised that there were two broad options available to the UK:

• investing “maximum effort” in the 15 months before the end of 2005 to “put in

place the structures, forces and economic benefits that can ensure a successful

outcome” (effectively trained Iraqi security forces, including the police) and then

aiming to withdraw in early 2006; or

• deciding that the UK would need to make a longer-term commitment to Iraq,

“whether from a desire to ‘see the job through’, to stay alongside the US at all

costs, or for its [the UK’s] own regional policy reasons”, recognising that this

would be against a backdrop of continuing insurgency and attacks on the MNF-I.

158. Lt Gen McColl did not make a recommendation in favour of either option, but

stressed the need for the UK to come to a decision “in a timely fashion”. In particular,

if the UK was to opt to make a longer-term commitment, it must:

“… go into this with its eyes open and, specifically, must put in place now the force

protection measures required to minimise this risk as far as possible.”

159. Lt Gen McColl drew his paper to the attention of Gen Walker the next day,

suggesting that “the time is right for the consideration of the substantive issues”.73

160. In a telephone conversation with President Bush on 24 September, Mr Blair set out

three priority issues, as discussed with Prime Minister Allawi: the need to strengthen his

(Allawi’s) office; accelerating work to show the ISF had capacity to act; and increasing

the pace of development activity.74

161. On 24 September Mr Blair sent a note to Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr David Hill

(Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy), Mr Godric Smith (Mr Blair’s

Official Spokesperson) and Baroness Sally Morgan (Director of Political and

Government Relations) on what messages they should be feeding into the public

debate on Iraq.75

162. Mr Blair characterised the debate as:

“… have we got the country into a mess and therefore any bad news is our fault;

or is Iraq the battleground whose outcome will determine our own security and

therefore the bad news is worth it in the end?”

73 Minute McColl to CDS and CJO, 26 September 2004, ‘Report 130 of 26 Sep 04’.

74 Letter Quarrey to Owen, 24 September 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Phone Conversation with President

Bush, 24 September’.

75 Minute TB to Powell, 24 September 2004, [untitled].

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