The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“vi. the
success of our plans will depend greatly on the ability of the
Iraqi
Government
to deliver the necessary political conditions. Other risks and
challenges
to our
plans include our ability to tackle police corruption, continuing
Iranian
influence
and militia activity, and the willingness and ability of Iraqi Army
10 Division
to provide
security.”
“Transition
– in particular security transition – is fundamental to the
coalition’s
strategy in
Iraq …
“Assuming –
and being seen to assume – full control of Iraq’s security
institutions
has also
been among the Iraqi Government’s highest priorities.”
529.
The paper
explained that it had been recognised in summer 2006 that
significant
work was
needed to achieve the conditions for transfer to PIC in Basra. The
result
was the
‘Better Basra’ plan, delivered through Op SINBAD and the work of
the British
Embassy
Office and PRT in Basra. This intensified effort was “yielding
results, though it
will need
to be maintained in the period up to and following PIC”. The paper
suggested
that
although “we should avoid setting unrealistic and rigid benchmarks
for PIC” a
“pragmatic
minimum” needed to be agreed that was credible to the UK and
US.
530.
The paper then
contained an assessment of each of the conditions for
transition
to PIC
in Basra.
531.
On the threat
level, the paper stated that reported levels of violence in
southern
Iraq were
“relatively low”, although much of the data was “incomplete or
conflicting”.
For example,
although the reported murder rate had dropped from 100 per month
to
30 per
month, many murders were not reported.
532.
Officials
urged caution about relying on polling data that suggested
public
perceptions
were more positive in Basra than elsewhere in Iraq, and recorded
that
“some other
sources of information paint a different picture, of a
deteriorating security
situation,
an increase in indirect fire attacks, continuing militia activity
and intimidation …
and a
pervasive culture of fear among Basrawis”.
533.
On the
strength of the ISF, the paper recorded an improvement in basic
police
capability,
with 70 percent of police stations at the level required for PIC.
However, trust
in the IPS
remained low and “some assessments indicate that the IPS continue
to do
more to
undermine than guarantee security”. Militia infiltration of the
police remained the
key barrier
to tackling militia activity effectively.
534.
The paper
stated that the Iraqi Army had also demonstrated “an improved
ability to
respond to
security threats”, but had also been shown to be unreliable. The
main issue
was the
quality of leadership.
100