The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
647.
By the end of
April, Mr Hoon had announced that UK troop levels would fall
to
between
25,000 and 30,000 by the middle of May, from an initial peak of
around 46,000.
648.
Consequently,
by the start of May there was a clearly articulated expectation of
a
rapid
drawdown of UK forces by the autumn despite the identified risk
that the consent
of the
local population was built on potentially vulnerable foundations,
which could be
undermined
rapidly and with serious consequences.
649.
In the absence
of a functioning Iraqi police force and criminal justice
system,
and without
a clear Coalition Phase IV plan, looting and score‑settling became
a
serious
problem in Baghdad soon after the regime fell. The looting of
ministry buildings
and damage
to state‑owned infrastructure in particular added to the
challenges
of the Occupation.
650.
Reflecting in
June 2004, Mr David Richmond, the Prime Minister’s
Special
Representative
on Iraq from March to June 2004, judged that the failure to crack
down
on looting
in Baghdad in April 2003 released “a crime wave which the Coalition
has
never been
able to bring fully under control”.233
651.
After visiting
Iraq in early May 2003, General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of
the
General
Staff, observed:
“A security
vacuum still exists [in Baghdad] ... particularly at night.
Looting,
revenge
killing and subversive activities are rife … Should a bloody and
protracted
insurgency
establish itself in Baghdad, then a ripple effect is likely to
occur.”234
652.
Gen Jackson
recognised that the UK’s ability to maintain the consent of
the
population
in the South depended on a stable and secure Baghdad, and
advised:
“The bottom
line is that if we choose not to influence Baghdad we must be
confident
of the US
ability to improve [its tactics] before tolerance is lost and
insurgency
sets in.”
653.
Gen Jackson,
Major General David Richards (Assistant Chief of the
General
Staff) and
Lieutenant General Sir Anthony Pigott (Deputy Chief of the
Defence Staff
(Commitments))
all offered advice in favour of deploying the UK’s 16 Air Assault
Brigade
to Baghdad
to support Coalition efforts to retrain Iraqi police officers and
get them back
on
patrol.
654.
However, the
Chiefs of Staff collectively considered that the benefits of
making
a
contribution to the security of Baghdad were outweighed by the risk
that UK troops
would be
“tied down” outside the UK’s Area of Responsibility, with adverse
impact, and
233
Telegram
359 IraqRep to FCO London, 28 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Valedictory: The
End of Occupation’.
234
Minute CGS
to CDS, 13 May 2003, ‘CGS Visit to Op. TELIC 7‑10 May
2003’.
88