The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
after
deployment in order to facilitate the staffing and subsequent
integration
of Urgent
Operational Requirement”.
•
The EC
Branch was “constrained in its operation due to the lack of an
agreed
and
authoritative Directive”. The report recommended that operational
and EC
chains
should “develop and agree an appropriate Directive comprising
TOR
[Terms of
Reference], roles and responsibilities and CONOPS”.
•
The
Customer Two focus and procedures for the integration of UOR
capabilities
deployed
directly to an operational theatre was “not clear”. It cited the
need to
implement
the Standing Instruction from 26 November 2004.
88.
In his
statement for the Inquiry, Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy,
CJO from July
2004 to
March 2006, described the role of PJHQ as:
“… to act
as the interface between the in‑theatre force and the MOD and Front
Line
Commands
(FLC), particularly in ensuring that the in‑theatre force is
provided with
the
wherewithal to deliver its objectives. This required a constant
dialogue at every
level,
between the MOD, PJHQ, FLC and in‑theatre force.”39
89.
ACM Torpy
wrote that he had “inherited a Joint force structure … that
was
appropriately
sized to deliver the military objectives” he had been given; and
that the
in‑theatre
commanders, including the GOC MND (SE), were required to conduct a
Force
Level
Review every six months to “validate their force requirements”.
Those reviews
were
“undertaken in consultation with the PJHQ” and “presented to the
CDS (and the
Chiefs of
Staff) for endorsement”. That “imposed an important level of
discipline” and
“provided
the vehicle for force level increases if conditions in a particular
component
demanded
additional capability”.
90.
On 10 October
2006, the extent to which capability gaps were being
anticipated
in UK
theatres was raised by General Sir Timothy Granville‑Chapman,
Vice Chief of
Defence
Staff, following a meeting about helicopter availability in
Afghanistan.40
91.
On 27 October,
Gen Granville‑Chapman’s Private Office wrote to
Lieutenant
General
Nicholas Houghton, CJO, requesting a report on “how effective we
currently
are and how
we might be more so” in predicting emerging capability requirements
and
reporting
these back to the UK after “the recent debate on what capabilities
are needed
for
operations” had “thrown the spotlight” on the
issue.41
39
Statement,
14 June 2010, pages 4‑6.
40
Minute
Granville‑Chapman to ACDS(Ops), 10 October 2006, ‘Helicopter
Availability’.
41
Minute
MA/VCDS to MA/CJO, 27 October 2006, ‘Theatre Articulation of
Capability Requirements’.
18