17 |
Civilian casualties
221.
An Iraqi
Government spokesperson commented on 12 October that “these
figures
[in the
study] are unrealistic and give a very exaggerated
picture”.138
222.
A DFID
Statistics Adviser provided advice on the study to IPU on 12
October, at
their
request.139
He
concluded that “in essence, the method is tried and
tested”.
223.
Professor
Anderson provided his views on the study the following
day.140
He
stated
that he had
received comments on the study from an independent expert on
statistical
epidemiology
and demography. Professor Anderson advised:
“… the
study design is robust and employs methods that are regarded as
close to
‘best
practice’ in this area, given the difficulties of data collection
and verification in
the present
circumstances in Iraq … The methods are an improvement on
those
used in the
2004 Lancet
article by
the same author …”
224.
Professor
Anderson advised that deaths were much more prevalent
among
adolescent
to middle‑aged men and suggested that bias might remain with
respect to
the level
of non‑combatant mortality.
225.
Professor
Anderson concluded that, given the reasonably robust study
design
and
appropriate analysis methods, the UK Government should be cautious
in publicly
criticising
the Lancet
study.
226.
An IPU
official produced a brief on the study for Mr Blair later on
13 October.141
The brief
summarised the advice from the DFID Statistics Adviser
and
Professor Anderson,
and identified several “key points”:
“•
… People
are dying at the hands of those who choose violence to pursue
their
aims
…
•
There are
conflicting estimates [of the number of civilian casualties] from
a
number of
sources, and no comprehensive or accurate figures;
•
The numbers
that the Lancet
has
extrapolated are a substantial leap from other
figures.
There is no reason to assume the Lancet
figure is
any more accurate
than any
other is.”
227.
The same IPU
official wrote to colleagues on 16 October:
“… we do
not (not) accept that the figures quoted in the Lancet
survey
are
accurate …
The figures are extraordinarily high and significantly larger than
the
figures
quoted by the Iraq Body Count or Iraqi Government – however the
survey
methodology
used here cannot be rubbished, it is a tried and tested way
of
138
Briefing
IPU, 13 October 2006, ‘The
Lancet: Iraq: a
Cross‑Sectional Cluster Survey Sample’.
139
Email DFID
[junior official] to FCO [junior official], 12 October 2006,
‘Foreign Secretary Comment on the
Lancet
Report’.
140
Minute
APS/CSA to DJC‑Sec10, 13 October 2006, ‘Iraq – Mortality After the
2003 Invasion of Iraq:
a Cross‑Sectional
Cluster Sample Survey – Lancet
October
2006’.
141
Briefing
IPU, 13 October 2006, ‘The
Lancet: Iraq: a
Cross‑Sectional Cluster Survey Sample’.
209