4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

444. In a note to No.10 officials covering a range of issues on 15 September, Mr Blair

wrote on Iraq:

“The dossier is crucial. The expectations must be right. Remember the case

we need to make is for the return of a tough inspection regime, not that he

[Saddam Hussein] is about to launch a strike. In my view, advice to me from

the JIC is sufficiently persuasive.”220

445. Mr Blair told the Hutton Inquiry:

“The purpose of the dossier was to respond to the call to disclose the intelligence

we knew but at that stage the strategy was not to use the dossier as the immediate

reason to go to conflict, but as the reason why we had to return to the issue of

Saddam and weapons of mass destruction …”221

446. There were a number of significant changes in the revised draft of

the dossier of 16 September, including giving prominence in the Executive

Summary to:

• the IISS judgement that Iraq could obtain a nuclear weapon within months

if it obtained fissile material, rather than the JIC’s more conservative view

of one to two years which was not mentioned in the Summary;

• Saddam Hussein’s readiness to use weapons of mass destruction and his

determination to retain them; and

• a statement that the JIC judged that Iraq continued to produce chemical

and biological agents.

447. Mr Scarlett sent a revised version of the dossier to JIC members on 16 September,

which put the description of Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile

programmes first.222

448. The draft did not contain a draft Foreword; the development of the text signed

by Mr Blair is discussed later in this Section.

449. The key additions to the Executive Summary from the previous draft were

references to:

• the “valuable assessment” in the IISS paper of 9 September, including that it

judged “Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile

material from foreign sources”;

220 Note Blair [to No.10 officials], 15 September 2002, [extract ‘Iraq’].

221 The Hutton Inquiry, public hearing, 28 August 2003, page 10.

222 Minute Scarlett to JIC Members, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq WMD: Papers for Public Presentation’

attaching Paper, ‘Iraq’s Programme for Weapons of Mass Destruction: The British Government

Assessment’.

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