6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
funds to
the ICRC, which was undertaking similar preparations to those
recommended
by DFID
officials.
475.
Ms Short also
rejected the proposed deployments to Amman and the HIC
in
Cyprus, on
the grounds that it pre-supposed a significant role for DFID, which
it was
as yet
unable to promise.
476.
The meeting
considered DFID’s response to three possible
scenarios:
“a. US/UK
bilateral action; no second Security Council resolution (SCR); US
military
governor
without UN mandate:
– DFID
would work through whichever international agencies were
willing
to engage:
the UN, Red Cross, and others.
b. Second
SCR but overall US lead:
– DFID
would provide funding to UK military for QIPs; and work through
the
UN, Red
Cross and others.
c. Second
SCR with UN mandate:
– DFID
would wish to be positively engaged – exactly how would
depend
on financial
package available.”
DFID would
need to consider each scenario, and variations on them, in the
light of the
amount of
finance made available.
477.
Ms Short also
asked officials to reconsider wording used in draft replies
to
Parliamentary
Questions that suggested DFID had “well-established systems
for
responding
to humanitarian crises”. Iraq was a very different
case.
478.
Dr Brewer
briefed the Chiefs of Staff on DFID’s approach to humanitarian
planning
on 19
February.
479.
Ms Short’s
meeting was a key exchange that defined DFID’s approach to
the
immediate
pre-conflict period:
•
DFID would
prioritise “humanitarian considerations” over wider
reconstruction.
•
In the
absence of further resources for humanitarian assistance and
to
avoid
suggesting that military action was a certainty, DFID:
{{would
prioritise support for the UN and the wider international
effort
throughout
Iraq and the region;
{{would
not prepare for contingencies that exceeded its
current
resources;
and
{{would
not deploy its full humanitarian response capability to
support
the
immediate humanitarian effort in Iraq.
393