6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
•
There was
“a large thriving diplomatic, UN and NGO community established
in
Baghdad”.
If the UK hoped to tap into that it would be necessary for
officials to
123.
A fourth
report, on regime change, stated:
•
Regime
change was being discussed “frequently and openly by many
diplomats,
and by some
Iraqis too”.
•
The
assumption in the diplomatic community in Baghdad was that there
would
be military
action and that, as a result, the regime would be
toppled.
•
It was
agreed by “all” that there was a risk of destabilisation of the
country if
there were
not either a “massive external commitment on the ground” or
a
continuation
of the “current system of order” following regime
change.
•
“Concerns
about an Arab or Islamic backlash against a large Western
presence
seem
unfounded. The Iraqi society is already lapping up whatever
American
culture it
can get – Coca Cola, Western clothes, Western music, Western
films
and British
football …”82
124.
The February
round-up from Amman stated that there had recently been
a
significant
turnover of senior staff within the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, with all
under
secretaries removed in the name of combating
corruption.83
It also
reported:
“...
continued apathy on the streets. Despite the feeling that something
is really
going to
happen this time, those who can run have already done so. There is
little
to do
except watch the space over Baghdad.”
125.
After
President Bush’s State of the Union address on 29 January 2002
(the
“axis of
evil” speech), UK policy makers began to consider more closely
the
objectives
and possible consequences of military action in Iraq.
126.
Mr Blair
sought further advice on what might follow Saddam Hussein
before
meeting
President Bush at Crawford on 6 April 2002.
127.
On 19
February, the Cabinet Office commissioned papers for Mr Blair’s
planned
meeting
with President Bush after Easter (see Section 3.2).84
128.
On 20
February, Mr Alan Goulty, FCO Director Middle East and North
Africa,
produced a
paper on contingency planning in the event of military action
against
81
Teleletter
Amman [junior official] to MED [junior official], 24 January 2002,
‘Iraq: Political’.
82
Teleletter
Amman [junior official] to MED [junior official], 24 January 2002,
‘Iraq: Regime Change’.
83
Teleletter
Amman [junior official] to MED [junior official], 5 March 2002,
‘Iraq: Feb sitrep’.
84
Minute
McKane to Manning, 19 February 2002, ‘Papers for the Prime
Minister’.
135