4.4 | The
search for WMD
547.
On
10 November, Sir Nigel Sheinwald informed Mr Blair that
Dr Kay
expected to
report to Congress again in February or March 2004. Dr Kay
hoped
to have
more evidence of WMD programmes, but expected the basic story to
be
unchanged.
548.
During a
meeting with Sir Nigel Sheinwald in Baghdad on 8 November, Dr
Kay said
that the
ISG had uncovered more material since the Interim
Report:
•
evidence of
development of a ceramic warhead for CW use in 2001:
•
details of
the movement of suspect items to Syria immediately before the
war;
•
work on the
stability of CW precursor agents between July 2002 and
January
2003;
•
laboratory
testing of advanced chemical agents; and
•
an anthrax
stimulant production line “up to the outbreak of
war”.300
549.
Dr Kay was
reported to have criticised Coalition handling of detainees. Many
had
been
debriefed for tactical information only and there was a severe
shortage of trained
interrogators.
550.
Dr Kay
envisaged that, by June 2004, the ISG would have about 80 percent
of
the picture
on Iraqi WMD. At that point, it might be appropriate to reconsider
its role. He
did not
want it to have an open-ended, diminishing role, or to see it
refocused on other
tasks. By
June 2004, he would also expect Iraq to perceive the ISG as very
intrusive.
551.
As part of his
wider report on his visit to Iraq (see Section 9.2), Sir Nigel
Sheinwald
told
Mr Blair that Dr Kay expected to report to Congress again in
February or March
2004.301
Dr Kay
hoped to have further specific evidence of WMD programmes, but
the
basic story
would be unchanged. Sir Nigel had told Dr Kay that, if there was a
further
interim
report, better handling would be needed: “a proper strategy with
the key points
identified
in advance so that we were not put on the back foot by
leaks”.
552.
Sir Nigel
asked Mr Blair whether there was anything else he wanted said
to Dr Kay
or the CIA.
Mr Blair replied:
“Just keep
me informed as to what he’s finding; & surely we must now know
what
happened to
WMD. What do our pre-war contacts say?”302
553.
Mr Scarlett
informed Sir Nigel on 17 November that he had asked the DIS
to
review the
new material described by Dr Kay in his meeting with Sir Nigel
Sheinwald.303
The DIS had
concluded, “not for the first time, Kay may have talked up some of
the
300
Letter
Cannon to Scarlett, 10 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Iraq Survey
Group: Sir Nigel Sheinwald’s Meeting
with David
Kay’.
301
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 10 November 2003, ‘Visit to
Iraq’.
302
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister,
10 November 2003, ‘Visit to Iraq’.
303
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 17 November 2003, ‘Lunch with David
Kay’.
533